Several hours later I learned
that it was Val and that they
had crashed near Walkerville.
Vans is just outside the Lanseria
TMA, so I guess she was skirting
around that on her way to
Vereeniging.
The accident records are littered
with fatalities of high-hour IF
pilots dying in light aircraft in
weather-related accidents. Why?
A sense of invincibility? Well,
that is material for another
thread perhaps. My concern is
for the PPL who is f lying an
aircraft which is only really
suited to that “soft IMC”. I think
we need proper training for that
circumstance.
From the CAA accident report:
“Inadvertent”, my foot. She saw that
storm and flew right into it. Why do
22,000-hour IF pilots do this?
The tragic thing is that Val,
apart from being highly
experienced, was a very cautious,
conservative pilot, especially
when it came to weather. The
fact that she took off from
Pietersburg on a VFR f light
plan when the conditions did not
support this indicate to me that
on this occasion, for some reason,
she was probably not sufficiently
prepared for the conditions she
encountered en-route. Instead
of re-fileing IFR inf light, she
initially wanted to return to
Pietersburg to refile –
it was the controller who
prompted her to refile the f light
plan on the radio.As far as the Val accident,
she deliberately f lew into that
storm after ATC warned her
and she apparently responded
”We are capable”.Technology won’t save your
butt, you have to work and think
and plan. Technology includes
things like two engines and GPS.
These are nice-to-haves which
have the potential to complicate
matters to such an extent that it
can actually kill you. Don’t rely
on the extra engine or the GPS.
What the absence of dozens, or
many, or even one fatal in a single
piston as a result of engine failure
in IMC under IFR is telling us
is that if you do things right, it
will be safe. The procedures have
been developed over decades,
costing the lives of many, and we
are fortunate to have this precious
legacy, i.e., safe procedures. The
procedures will save your life,
the technology will not, the
extra engine will also not. Do
your planning, make intelligent
decisions, when in doubt don’t
fly, and live to fly another day.Aiming to make safer pilots of us, here veteran instructor Jim Davis looks at extracts
from official CAA Accident Reports from his homeland of South Africa and analyses
why things went wrong and how we may all avoid making similar mistakes.
australianflying.com.au 75
March – April 2015 AUSTRALIAN FLYINGMARTIN EADIEWhat Can We Learn?
I believe that peer pressure
played a major role in this
accident. Remember that
Val was demonstrating the
advantages of owning a
pressurised aeroplane that was
meant to reduce the problems
of bad-weather flying. Imagine
if she didn’t have any pax and
there was no hurry to get home –
I have a feeling she would have
spent the night in Pietersburg
and returned the next morning.
But this is just my gut feeling
because I have this thing about
pilots allowing themselves to
be bullied by peer pressure,
whether implied or actual.
By “implied” peer pressure I
mean such things as: “My wife is
expecting me home.” “It’s my kid’s
birthday tomorrow.” “I promised
to take them to the rugby.” “All
the other aircraft are heading
for home, so it must be OK.” “My
boss needs this aeroplane in the
morning.” And so on.
In Val’s case it was “I really
want to sell this aeroplane,
so let’s demonstrate it’s all-
we a t her a bilit y.”
The older I get the more
I believe that some form of
pressure is the root cause of
the majority of light aircraft
accidents.
And it is not difficult to
overcome this problem. All you
have to do is ask yourself if you
would undertake the proposed
flight if there wasn’t another
human being in the world.
Think about it – it works!
Finally, remember what
Jimmy Doolittle said: “There
is no reason to fly near a
thunderstorm in peacetime.”