FlyPast 02.2018

COLD WAR 1957 WHITE PAPER

96 FLYPAST February 2018

trained and better designed for the

tasks that lie ahead.”

The White Paper brought about the

cancellation of cutting edge projects:

the Avro 730 supersonic bomber, the

Saunders-Roe SR.177 rocket-plus-jet

interceptor, the Fairey Delta III long-

range fighter and the Hawker P.1121

supersonic strike aircraft, successor

to the Hunter. None had entered

production – the English Electric P.1

Lightning only survived because it

was so close to entry into service that

cancellation would not have saved

money.

The increasing complexity of

weapons systems was thought to be

beyond that which reservist training

could achieve, so the Royal Auxiliary

Air Force’s flying role and

the Air Branch of the Royal Navy

Volunteer Reserve were terminated.

The Short Seamew lightweight anti-

submarine aircraft was no longer

required for the latter and did not

enter service.

Persuasive contraction

The government wanted to reduce

the cost of aeronautical research and

development without crippling an

industry that could benefit from

a rapidly expanding civil market.

Consequently, there would be support

for the Bristol Type 223 supersonic

transport (Concorde) and a few other

promising designs such as the Fairey

Rotodyne intercity transport.

But with military orders accounting

for 70% of the aviation industry’s

workload, the Sandys’ paper would

seriously contract British aircraft

manufacturing capacity. Even then

“... the units of the industry while

fewer in number must also be

made individually more powerful,

financially, in their technical and

production resources, and in their

sales and servicing organisations

overseas.”

Government influence was to

be brought to bear to hasten the

formation of suitable groupings

through ‘persuasion’ and the selective

allocation of government contracts.

This was formally announced

by Aubrey Jones in May 1958.

He described the process as “...

something intermediate between full

government authority and complete

laissez-faire. What we

need is a combination

of impulse from

above, compelling

the assumption of

responsibility on the

part of industry itself.”

This policy had

already been partially

implemented with the formation

of Airco – a de Havilland-led

consortium including Fairey and

Hunting – that had won British

European Airway’s contract for

the Trident jetliner. However, the

most direct instrument to force

rationalisation was Operational

Requirement 339, the Canberra

replacement, which begat the TSR.2.

This was the only way the UK could

keep pace with the US in developing

and procuring more complex aircraft.

There was to be no more muddling

through.

Beer and radiators

The technological thrust of

Sandys’ thinking was: “let us focus

on designing the latest and best

platforms and weapons to ensure

the UK retains a seat at the top

table”. The industry had to return

to pre-Korean War levels with

the government anticipating that

around 100,000 jobs would be lost

(from a total of just over 300,000).

Concern over the threat posed

by missiles to manned aircraft was

reflected across the Atlantic. The

Mach 3-capable North American

XB-70 Valkyrie bomber was later

cancelled and the development of its

chronological cousin, the Lockheed

SR-71 Blackbird, redirected.

Sandys felt the future lay in

rationalisation, a new generation

of military aircraft and industrial

co-operation. The Avro 730 had

to be sacrificed to help pay for

Blue Streak. He was in favour of

collaboration with Europe – there

was a section in the White Paper on

this.

He needed to save the big aviation

design teams and if orders were

slack, companies should diversify.

Hawker ended up making barrels

for Watneys Red Barrel beer, and

Above

A wind tunnel model

of the ‘Thin-Winged’

Javelin, the P.536

proposal. TONY

BUTTLER

Above right

General arrangement

of the P.356 ‘second-

generation’ Javelin.

TONY BUTTLER