The Curse of Philosophy 371
that whatever contradicts the literal text of Koran and Hadith cannot
be rational at all. In this, he diametrically opposes Ibn Rushd who,
in the case of disagreement between the Koran and the requirements
of rationality, argues for interpreting the Koranic text in a way that
favors rationality. For Ibn Taymiyya, it is the revealed text and the
statements of the prophet which ultimately determine what is ratio-
nal and what is not. Pure rationality is embodied in the Koran and
Hadith; what is not in agreement with them is both unoriginal and
rationally corrupt. Accordingly, true knowledge is that which is taken
directly from Koran and Hadith, and there is no certain evidence oth-
er than what is included in the revealed corpus as transmitted by the
infallible prophet Muḥammad. Whatever does not agree with this cor-
pus is disqualified from the realm of reason. As philosophy is essen-
tially a rational activity of investigation and critique independent of
the authority of revelation, Ibn Taymiyya’s conception of rationality
as part of the outcome of revelation provides just the opposite of that
what philosophy is.^180
Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya’s works include philosophical components
appropriately assimilated into a comprehensive theological image, dif-
ferent aspects of which are spread throughout his numerous writings.
These philosophical components are utilized to support his theologi-
cal arguments and to attack the philosophers with their own weap-
ons. It has also been stated that, beyond his deep knowledge of phi-
losophy, he “shares with the philosophers the philosophical spirit”
which strives to penetrate thoroughly into the essence of subjects,
and like them he is mindful of “determining the meaning of words
accurately”.^181 Despite this shared spirit, however, Ibn Taymiyya’s
180 Abrahamov, Binyamin: Ibn Taymiyya on the Agreement of Reason with Tra-
dition, in: The Muslim World 82 (1992), pp. 256–272, presents Ibn Taymiyya’s
arguments rejecting the preference of reason to tradition, as they are included
in Darʾ taʾāruḍ al-ʿaql wal-naql, and locating the truth exclusively in revela-
tion. On this intensively debated question in Islamic philosophy and theology,
see, for instance: Arberry, Arthur J.: Revelation and Reason in Islam, London
1957; Frank, Richard M.: Reason and Revealed Law. A Sample of Parallels and
Divergences in Kalām and Falsafa, in: Roger Arnaldez and Simone van Riet
(eds.): Recherches d’Islamologie. Recueil d’articles offert à Georges C. Anawati
et Louis Gardet par leur collègues et amis, Louvain 1978.
181 Fuʾād, ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Aḥmad: Ibn Taymiyya wa-mawqifuhu min al-fikr
al-falsafī, Alexandria 1980, p. 273. In a more recent publication, Fuʾād declares
Ibn Taymiyya as the representative of ahl al-sunna in their critique of “the
philosophers of Islam and the Sufis”: Fuʾād, ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Aḥmad: Falāsifat
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