372 Georges Tamer
religious understanding of rationality makes it difficult to label him
as a philosopher. While the philosophers held that the highest happi-
ness could be achieved by the intellectual contemplation of non- or
extra-doctrinal metaphysical truths, Ibn Taymiyya, in contrast, held
that true happiness comes from knowledge of God and the perfec-
tion and salvation of the soul in the afterlife. The Koran – not human
reason – was the appropriate guide on this path; as such, scripture was
the ultimate basis for all truth and took direct precedence if in conflict
with reason. In this context, Ibn Taymiyya would consider it a curse
to be called a philosopher.
Despite obvious historical and cultural differences as well as the
different theological conception of scriptures in Christianity and
Islam, Ibn Taymiyya’s usage of philosophy reminds me of the way
the Church Fathers of the East used Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic and
Neoplatonic concepts to articulate Christian doctrines. The work of
these Fathers cannot be considered philosophy; Ibn Taymiyya, com-
pared to them, is just as unqualified to be called a philosopher as they
are. Furthermore, Thomas Aquinas called philosophy the maid of
theology, thus giving philosophy a separate though subordinate state
in relation to theology. Ibn Taymiyya, in fundamentally subsuming
rationality to the words of Koran and Hadith, goes farther to deny
rationality a similar state.
In this context, the role Ibn Taymiyya ascribes to the prophet
Muhammad is pivotal. As Muhammad is the deliverer of revelation,
he is the absolute authority in regards to the truth: what he said is
true and serves as criterion to determine the truth of theological and
philosophical statements. Muḥammad’s authority passes to the body
of religious scholars (ʿulamāʾ), who are “the heirs of the prophets”
(al-ʿulamāʾ warathat al-anbiyāʾ) according to a famous tradition in
Islam.^182 Yet, the articulated truth of these scholars depends on their
participation in the community consensus (ijmāʿ) founded exclusively
on the ultimate source of this spiritual lineage: namely, the Koran and
Hadith. Ibn Taymiyya’s reasoning, therefore, reveals its conclusively
circular form.
al-islām wal-ṣūfiyya wa-mawqif ahl al-sunna minhum, Alexandria 2006,
pp. 10–11, 98–100, 120–122, 129–130, 133–136 et passim.
182 Rosenthal, Franz: Knowledge Triumphant. The Concept of Knowledge in
Medieval Islam; with an introduction by Dimitri Gutas, Leiden and Boston
2007, p. 38.
Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological University
Authenticated