The Economist June 11th 2022 37
Asia
Afghanistan’seconomy
Guns over butter
T
he medina bazaarneighbourhood in
Kabul used to be a jolly mess of con
sumption and construction. As Afghani
stan’s economy surged, helped along by
billions of dollars in foreign aid, business
men invested in property. Shopping plazas
and wedding halls sprang up. Shops selling
everything from women’s fashion to gro
ceries were busy with keen customers.
Traders prospered. Today, the area is still
packed. But the throngs of people are there
for handouts of food from the un. The
stores are empty. Mohammad Younis, a lo
cal tailor, is struggling to feed his 11 chil
dren. “I have a shop, but no one comes in. I
just sit there all day,” he says.
It was less than a year ago that the Tali
ban took control of Afghanistan as Ameri
can troops left, the government collapsed
and security forces evaporated. The world
watched in horror as crowds gathered at
Kabul airport, desperate to flee. Some were
killed in bombings. Others clung to depart
ing aircraft and fell from the sky. Many
have left the country since.
Most who remain face penury. In the
last four months of 2021 the economy con
tracted by more than a third compared
with the same period a year earlier. Private
businesses have laid off about threefifths
of employees. Food prices are rising by 18%
year on year. Families that were middle
class a year ago are surviving on a single
meal a day. More than half the country’s
people face acute hunger. Some have taken
to selling organs or children.
Part of the reason for their suffering is
that Afghanistan was cut off from the glo
bal economy the moment the Taliban took
control in August. The foreign funding that
had propped up the state was halted. Af
ghanistan’s centralbank reserves, mostly
held in America, were frozen, then seized.
Sanctions mean Afghan banks can no lon
ger transact with those abroad.
When the Taliban seized power, it
seemed obvious that they would struggle
to switch from running a violent insurgen
cy to administering a country of 40m, es
pecially for lack of money. Yet the new gov
ernment’s finances appear to be in much
better shape than anybody expected. Last
month the group announced its first full
year budget, forecasting revenues of
$2.1bn.The World Bank’s estimate is more
modest but still impressive: it reckons the
government will collect about $1.7bn this
year (about 12% of gdp) in domestic rev
enue, from things like taxes, customs and
fees for services.
That is nearly threequarters of the
$2.3bn the previous government raised do
mestically in 2020, before business
tanked, trade dried up and many taxpaying
Afghans left the country. (Its total funding
including foreign finance came to $5.7bn,
but the Taliban do not have access to the
grants and loans that made up the rest.)
That the Taliban have managed to keep
revenues flowing despite the obstacles is
remarkable. One reason for their success is
that they have plenty of experience collect
ing taxes. During their two decades as a re
bel army, they collected traditional tithes,
such as oshr, a share of farmers’ harvests,
and zakat, religious alms, in areas under
their control. David Mansfield, a research
er who has studied Afghanistan’s illicit
economy for 25 years, estimates the group
made between $27.5m and $35m a year tax
ing the drug trade and roughly another
$245m at checkpoints along main roads,
K ABUL
The Taliban government has proved surprisingly good at raising money.
It is letting its people starve anyway
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