TheEconomistNovember 2nd 2019 4912010 2015 2017 2019*ConservativeLabourSNPUKIP
OtherConservativeBrexitLabourSNPUKIPOtherLiberal
Democrat
Liberal
Democrat*WeightedaverageofselectedOctoberpolls Sources:BritishElectionStudy;TheEconomistVoteflowsbetween 2010 and 2019“I
met aman polishing his Ford Sierra—
self-employed electrician, dad always
voted Labour,” began Tony Blair when de-
scribing the type of voter Labour would be
after, ahead of his 1997 general election vic-
tory. It was, Labour’s thinking went, these
middle-of-the-road voters—suburban car-
washers in the West Midlands—who held
the keys to Downing Street. Two decades
later, political parties heading into the
election on December 12th will find it much
harder to identify the voters who will pro-
pel them to power.
For years, politicos held to the “median-
voter theory” beloved by Mr Blair. The idea
was that the party that focused on the con-
cerns of the typical voter would triumph,
while parties that catered to the fringe
would be punished. In this world the cen-
tre did more than just hold: it ruled.
These laws of political science have
since come crashing down. Since Brexit
sliced through traditional political alli-
ances, politics has become less of a simple
matter of left versus right. Parties hammer-ing out manifestos and preparing leaflets
for swing seats are thus grappling with
“Schrödinger’s median voter”, argues Mar-
cus Roberts, a pollster at YouGov: they are
unsure whether this mythical figure is
alive or dead.
If Brexit dominates the coming elec-
tion, the median voter will be no more.
When it comes to leaving the European Un-
ion, voters have polarised. There is little
sign of compromise between the Remainand Leave camps. Fishing in the gap be-
tween these two pools of votes will land
few votes, points out Chris Prosser of the
University of Manchester. When elections
are fought on economic issues, between
left and right, political parties can pick a
point in the middle and not go far wrong.
By contrast, “identity politics do not have
give and take,” says Geoffrey Evans of Ox-
ford University. It is relatively easy to com-
promise on, say, the level of tax. It is harder
to do so on notions such as sovereignty.
As voters are polarising, so are mps.
More than 50 are preparing to stand down
in December, including many Tory former
Remainers. Most of their successors will be
fully paid-up Leavers.
This division of politics into two oppos-
ing camps has been dubbed Ulsterisation.
In Northern Ireland, most people vote
along sectarian lines. Irish nationalists
will not carefully weigh up the economic
policy of the Democratic Unionist Party be-
fore casting their vote. Nor will ardent
unionists consider the merits of Sinn
Fein’s social policy. If Brexit divisions per-
sist, British politics could start looking
more Northern Irish, with Remain and
Leave the new sectarian divide (Remainers
have already discovered a love of marches).
Smaller parties have seized on this
strategy. The Liberal Democrats are stand-
ing on a policy of revoking Article 50 and
cancelling Brexit altogether. At the other
end of the political see-saw sits the BrexitThe centre foldsThe missing median voter
Tacking to the centre will do little good in the polarised coming electionBritain
50 WherenowforBrexit?
51 Theeconomyandtheelection
52 Bagehot: The four BorisesAlso in this sectionRead more from this week’s Britain section:
Economist.com/Britain