THE SOVIET–ISRAELI WAR, 1967–1973C. Advancing the missile shield dooms the Rogers Plan
On 22 August, Ambassador Beam finally took the matter up with First Deputy
Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov, but got little satisfaction. Nixon was prevailed
upon only in early September to issue explicit instructions to the Moscow embassy
for a firm response. Armed with these orders, Beam confronted Vladimir Vinogradov
on Thursday, 3 September.
This was a few days after Sergey Vinogradov (no relation), the ambassador to Eg ypt,
had died suddenly while on home leave.^34 Vladimir’s appointment to succeed him
would not be announced for another month, but he was fully prepared for what Beam
would call in retrospect “a sarcastic but amusing interview.” At the time, he was hardly
amused: he reported getting a “lengthy, repetitive, and largely unyielding reply.”
I told Vinogradov that, while we were taking up [the] matter with UAR, we regarded the
USSR as involved since Soviet weapons and personnel were there and that their people on
the ground must have knowledge of developments which were contrary to the ceasefire
agreement.
He then said “there were no Soviet weapons in the UAR,” although the UAR had bought
Soviet weapons. There were no Soviet troops there; only advisers and technicians.
Therefore ... the USSR was in no way involved in the Middle East crisis.By now, the Soviet deputy minister could add an accusation that the US was cover-
ing up for Israel’s walkout from the Jarring talks. He ignored Beam’s “personal sugges-
tion”—in fact a US climbdown—that if “quietly and without publicity ... the UAR
would withdraw some—maybe not all—of its missiles as a gesture, this would be a
small step toward ... returning Israel to the conference table.”
Vinogradov also aimed a barb at the Americans’ failure to determine the status quo
ante by aerial photography. “Since US planes are flying over eastern side of Suez
Canal and can see over both sides, USG should be able to determine accuracy of
UAR charges” that Israel was actually violating the ceasefire. Beam recalled in his
memoirs how Vinogradov “for my benefit ... acted out the steps which US pilots
presumably took to ‘pull down the window blinds when they flew over Israeli terri-
tory.’” Beam did not admit it to his interlocutor, but the Americans’ position was
weakened by their assessment that the Soviet accusations against Israel were not
unfounded, in respect of fortification and weapons upgrading, though much less
significant than the Soviet–Eg yptian violations. Vinogradov’s charge that the IAF
was preparing to renew air strikes the very next day never materialized.^35
Receiving Beam’s report in Washington, Assistant Secretary of State Sisco angrily
rejected Vinogradov’s assertions in a return cable:
we feel that USSR cannot take position [he] expressed ... There [is] no need to outline how
heavily involved USSR is in UAR with its own personnel and equipment. USSR and US