FLEXING MUSCLES WHILE OFFERING A PULLBACKthat direction. He also said Moscow understood that the question of the permanent
solution could not be broached with the Israelis before “well into 1973,” that is, after
the US election.^60
A few days later, after student demonstrations in Cairo protested his supposed
peace feelers, Sadat pointed to the renewed Phantom sales as one reason why the
“inevitable” war with Israel would have to be postponed. But he promised to fly to
Moscow again with his own shopping list for arms—and notified Sisco that Eg ypt
was breaking off talks with the United States. It was at this stage, in late January
1972—recalls Abramov, the Kavkaz staff officer—that Bezhevets was tasked with
photographing military targets inside Israel. He had done so once already, but this
time he was to pass directly over the “capital” and IDF headquarters, Tel Aviv.
Defense Minister Grechko’s strictures had by this time apparently been relaxed, in
view of the Foxbats’ proven invulnerability. Still, this was considered a complex and
risky operation, as the Soviets were uncertain whether the Israelis had received the
Nike system. Preparations for the flight involved the entire Kavkaz staff.
As these preparations progressed, on 28 January, Dobrynin pressed Kissinger again
for an answer, and reported that the latter complained the Americans “were encoun-
tering much greater difficulties than in the talks about West Berlin”—a situation that
he blamed on Israel. Kissinger now claimed (according to Dobrynin), contrary to his
statement a week before, that in their talks with Meir he and the president had “let
her understand clearly that [at the Moscow summit] the Middle East question would
be discussed ... regardless if Israel shares its thoughts or not.”
By contrast, Kissinger’s report to Nixon emphasizes Dobrynin’s anxieties about the
parallel efforts of the State Department:
He was horrified by Sisco[’s] ... compulsive tendency to talk ... There was also the danger
that Sisco would complicate their problems with the Eg yptians because the Soviets could
not put forward a position that was softer ... Wasn’t there some possibility that I could
simply order Sisco to stop?Dobrynin himself mentioned nothing like this in his report, relating only that
Kissinger had assured him “Sisco (and Rogers) are unaware” of the back-channel
exchanges. Kissinger thus appears to have exaggerated Soviet objections to State
Department involvement in order to press Nixon for a monopoly, on the grounds
that it would facilitate progress toward the summit.
It was also in the 28 January talk, with another visit by Sadat to Moscow approach-
ing, that Kissinger finally agreed that the Soviets might inform the Eg yptian presi-
dent about “the idea that was discussed with Gromyko.” According to Dobrynin,
Kissinger’s only proviso was that Washington be advised of such coordination.
Kissinger reported that he left it up to Gromyko how much to tell Sadat, but warned
against disclosing “substantive details.”^61