22. Jockeying and Posturing
A. Kissinger and Dobrynin both give away some secrets
On 1 March 1972, Kissinger reported that Dobrynin again complained about US
procrastination on the attractive deal that Moscow had offered: to trade the Soviet
presence in Eg ypt for Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders. Kissinger claimed to
have corrected him that the proposed US part of the deal was to promote a final
settlement, not to delineate specific borders.^1 But this came to light only with the
publication of the back-channel reports. In Kissinger’s memoirs, the only talk in
which the Middle East was discussed at all took place on 17 March 1972 (partly in
Nixon’s presence, so it hardly could be concealed). As for its substance, the memoirs
claim that it was only at this stage that
Dobrynin sought to engage me in a dialogue designed, in effect, to impose the extreme Arab
program. This did not fit into our strateg y as long as Soviet troops and advisers were so
prominent in Eg ypt and as long as the Soviet Union was supporting the radical Arabs. When
I countered with proposals related to Israel’s security concerns, he quickly lost interest.^2Kissinger’s own newly released summary of the 17 March talk is clearly at odds
with this description, and Dobrynin’s report is even more so:
Underlying all of Kissinger’s comments ... was the apprehension that the top-secret talks
they are conducting with us about expediting a Middle East settlement, i.e., about the
future status of Israel itself, could be made public in the US, especially at a time of height-
ened emotions during the election campaign. ... The “crazy fanatics” from the Jewish
Defense League would accuse him of “betraying Jews” and might then even make an
attempt on his, Kissinger’s, life.Dobrynin added another uncharitable appraisal of his back-channel partner who,
“it must be said, is not notable for great personal courage.” But for the Soviet ambas-
sador, the most startling part of the exchange was when Kissinger—retreating from
his previous reluctant agreement that Sadat be at least partially informed—seemed
to give away a vital Israeli intelligence asset: