NOTES
pp. [48–58]^
- Aleksey Vasiliev, Rossiya na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke: Ot messianstva k pragmatizmu,
Moscow: Nauka, 1993, pp. 96–7. - Semenov, “Ot Khrushcheva,” p. 135; Baev, “Bulgaria and the Middle East,” pp. 32–3.
- FRAMING THE CROSS-CANAL GOAL AND THE ATTRITION STRATEGY
- Semenov, “Ot Khrushcheva,” p. 135.
- Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. 2, document no. 299, p. 642.
- Abramov, Goluboe, pp. 35–6.
- Hershberg, Aftermath, p. 14.
- Nikolay Ufarkin, “Lashchenko, Petr Nikolaevich,” http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.
asp?Hero_id=1881 - Lt-Col. Avi Shai, “Mitzrayim liqrat milhemet yom ha-kippurim,” Ma’arakhot, 250 ( July
1975), p. 38n72, http://maarachot.idf.il/PDF/FILES/8/108768.pdf - Following quotations of Malashenko are from Vspominaya, pp. 244–93. Lashchenko actu-
ally overestimated the Israeli force; the front line was routinely held by two or three bat-
talions, that is, the equivalent of one brigade or less. In early 1968, the Israelis did begin
preparing a canal crossing of their own, for preemption of an Eg yptian attack or as a coun-
terstrike, but made little progress. According to Maj.-Gen. Yisra’el Tal, until June 1972
(when he took over as deputy chief of staff ), despite a prodigious investment, no practi-
cal crossing capability had been achieved and “the IDF couldn’t cross a sewage ditch.” AC,
Tal testimony, Part 1, p. 38, and Part 5, pp. 3–5. - Following quotations of Karpov are from “Vospominaniya,” pp. 83–100; of Serkov, from
Liniya fronta, pp. 18, 31, 123; “Afanasyev, Pavel Aleksandrovich,” in Znamenitye lyudi
Vo l o g d y, http://www.nason.ru/znamenit/2095. Abu Ghazala would command Eg yptian
artillery in the 1973 war and later become field marshal and minister of defense. - “Azovkin, Yury Petrovich,” http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=4320
- Hulda Kjeang Mørk, “The Jarring Mission: A Study of the UN Peace Effort in the Middle
East, 1967–1971,” master’s thesis, University of Oslo, 2007, passim. - “Comments by Soviet Official on the Possible Renewal of Arab–Israeli Hostilities and
Soviet Intentions,” CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 5 February 1968, https://www.
cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000126888.pdf - AC, testimony of Brig. Gen. Aryeh Shalev, p. 17.
- Kharchikov, “Na moryakh sredi zemli.”
- Charlie Charalambous, “Israeli Sub to Be Salvaged,” AFP, 5 October 1999; Amos Har’el,
Ha’aretz, 12 October 2000; Amir Rappaport, Ha’aretz, 25 January 2002, pp. 12–16. - “Soviet and Russian Navy ASW and AAW Ships,” http://www.hazegray.org/features/rus-
sia/destroy.htm. A Black Sea Fleet website states that, throughout 1968, the Soobrazitel’nyy
was “in a zone of military actions, [and] carried out a battle task of rendering assistance
to the armed forces of Eg ypt”; http://flot.sevastopol.info/eng/ship/largeaswdestroyers/
soobrazitelny.htm - On 4 February 1968, Erell’s subordinate and successor Avraham Botzer told a Knesset
committee that the Navy by then doubted the authenticity of both messages and attrib-