NOTES
pp. [148–150]^
Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2010, pp. 55–62. He was granted exclusive access to “four thick bind-
ers” of documents on Marwan. Though the book is obviously aimed at clearing the Mossad
and Zamir of falling for a double agent, it is authoritative as to the dates and places of
Marwan’s meetings with the Israelis.- Sharaf has been identified as a KGB contact since 1955 and later a full-fledged agent.
Sakharov, High Treason, p. 193; John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents,
New York: Bantam, 1974, pp. 70–8. - Bar-Joseph gives no specifics of Marwan’s reports until 27 April 1970. By then, the Soviet
presence in Eg ypt had been detected, and Marwan expressed his “contempt and hatred”
for the Soviets “who were taking over Eg ypt and its army.” Bar-Joseph admits that such
patriotism was rather rich, coming from an Eg yptian who was ostensibly selling out to his
country’s arch-enemy. But this does not affect Bar-Joseph’s certainty that Marwan was not
being operated by his Eg yptian superiors. Bar-Joseph, Angel, p. 88. - Dudchenko also relates (Chapter 8) that “Hassan” met his Mossad contact for the second
time in late September 1969 and claimed (to the Israeli’s disbelief ) that Eg ypt was already
negotiating the delivery of SAM-3s and the Soviets were already deploying troops there.
If not fictitious, this message was clearly not disinformation, and was aimed to deter Israeli
air raids until the Soviet-manned SAMs could be deployed. But, if so, it was ignored, which
was unusual for the Israelis in respect of Marwan’s reports. - Aviel Magnezi, ynet website, 8 July 2012, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,
L-4252869,00.html; AC, Ze’ira testimony, pp. 60–2, 88. - Bergman and Meltzer, Yom Kippur War, p. 177.
- There are indications that the Israelis already had additional sources inside the Eg yptian
government, or that Marwan was recruited earlier. For example, Amit (in Rabin’s pres-
ence) claimed on 26 February 1968 that “he had documentary evidence of USSR Deputy
Foreign Minister Semenov’s talks in Cairo.” Harold H. Saunders, memorandum of con-
versation, 26 February 1968. NARA, national security file, country file Israel, vol. 8, box
141. - Ronen Bregman, “Ashraf Marwan and Israel’s Intelligence Failure,” in Asaf Siniver (ed.),
The October 1973 War: Politics, Diplomacy, Legacy, London: Hurst, 2013, p. 208. - [Aryeh] Levin, embassy in Paris to Foreign Ministry, 6 February 1970; embassy in Vienna
to Foreign Ministry, 10 February 1970, both in ISA HZ-4604/5; Bergman and Meltzer,
Yom Kippur War, p. 177. - Rubinstein, Red Star, p. 107.
- Kissinger, memorandum for the president, 18 February 1970, NARA WSAG Mtg 2/11/70
USSR and Eg ypt, H-files, box H-72, folder 2. - Jacob D. Beam, Multiple Exposure: An American Ambassador’s Unique Perspective on East–
West Relations, New York: Norton, 1978, pp. 247, 249. - Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, pp. 145–6.
- Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 5 February 1970; Kissinger to Nixon, [misdated?] 4 February
1970, both in NARA NSC files, USSR, vol. VII, box 711. - Cohen, Israel’s Best Defense, p. 294. Rabin effectively accepted Heikal’s version when he