THE SOVIET PACKAGE UNTIED 241mation from Defense Initiative officials who overstated what could
soon be achieved. Johnson remarked that America had never taken
less than eight years to deploy a newly produced military system – and
there was no reason to expect the Initiative to come into operation any
sooner.^33
But all this occurred behind the scenes. Nobody emerged from the
American administration to contradict Weinberger. The result was
panic in Moscow political circles. It seemed to Soviet leaders that
America was hell-bent on intensifying the arms race – or at the very
least that Weinberger might soon bring the President over to such a
policy. Something had to be done to prevent this from happening. If
Weinberger had his way, the USSR would have to drop its commit-
ment to economic reform and dedicate increased expenditure on
military technology. Shevardnadze had failed to persuade Gorbachëv
that he would achieve nothing so long as he insisted on a single
general package of proposals for arms reduction. The Americans, as
Shevardnadze knew, were never going to yield to this demand. He had
felt frustrated about Gorbachëv’s negotiating tactics since the middle
of the Reykjavik summit. Subsequent contact with the Americans con-
vinced him that he was right and Gorbachëv wrong. But he could do
nothing to change the policy until others in the Politburo shared his
viewpoint and were willing to stand up and be counted inside the
leadership.
As it turned out, Weinberger’s campaign gave unintentional help to
Shevardnadze’s cause. As early as 20 January 1987, when the Big Five
met to consider the latest news from America, there was unanimous
approval for a challenge to Gorbachëv’s tactics. His rigidity was not just
dubious: it was downright dangerous, and a switch of direction was an
urgent requirement. Zaikov and everyone else appended their signa-
ture. All the interested agencies were in agreement about the desirability
of a fresh bargaining posture. Even Defence Minister Sokolov endorsed
the suggestion to untie the negotiating package so as to enable a separ-
ate deal on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The Reykjavik
understandings about the other categories of weaponry, they agreed,
should be adhered to. The Big Five’s priority was to avert the possibility
that Reagan’s administration might break the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. If Weinberger got his way, progress in the talks at Geneva would
become impossible. The USSR badly needed to display an openness to
compromise. It had to strengthen the hands of those in the American
Congress who wanted success in Switzerland.^34