68 { China’s Quest
necessity of Chinese intervention. This was well before the US landing at
Incheon, let alone the crossing of the 38th Parallel. Mao said:
If the US imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant
and would threaten us. We should not fail to assist the Koreans. We
must lend them our hand in the form of sending our military volunteers
there. The timing should be further decided, but we have to prepare
for this.^23
By late August, NEBDA analysts had surmised from the buildup of US forces
in Japan (in another testament to the caliber of Chinese intelligence in Japan)
and the movement of ships in the Pacific that an amphibious landing by US
forces was likely, outflanking the Northern forces attacking Pusan. NEBDA
analysts also concluded that Incheon was the most likely location for such an
enemy landing. Mao himself conveyed this warning to a North Korean rep-
resentative in late August, specifically identifying Incheon as the most likely
point of attack. North Korean leaders ignored the warning. Incheon was, of
course, where an American invasion force landed on September 15, taking
North Korean forces completely by surprise. By the end of August, CCP lead-
ers had concluded that a major reversal of the North Korean position was
likely, and that China would be required to rescue the North Korean regime.
“We should prepare for the worst, and prepare quickly,” Zhou instructed the
NEBDA in late August.
Also in late August, the NEBDA suggested to the CCP center that linking
Chinese intervention to the crossing of the 38th parallel by US forces would be
politically and militarily advantageous. Politically, this would enable the CCP
to cast the upcoming war as a defensive struggle to protect China’s Northeast,
something that would be useful with both Chinese and international audi-
ences. Militarily, waiting for US/UN forces to cross the 38th parallel would
shorten PLA logistic lines (which PLA planners knew would be exposed to US
air attack). Mao and the Politburo adopted the proposal. It was essential to
convince the Chinese people that the war was necessary to defend China and
thus appeal to their nationalism and patriotism. In line with this tactic, in late
September and early October Zhou Enlai made several statements linking
possible Chinese entry to crossing of the 38th parallel by US forces. As noted
earlier, US leaders regarded these warnings as a bluff; they simply did not
imagine that China’s leaders would feel they could gain from a war with the
United States. They were also confident that US military superiority was so
vast that if China did intervene, easy US victory could be achieved.
The US landing at Incheon forced a rapid northward retreat of North
Korean forces. Retreat became a rout. Shortly after the Incheon landing,
Stalin (not Kim Il Sung!) cabled Mao asking if China was in a position to send
forces to Korea. Or, Stalin asked, would China allow Kim Il Sung to set up an
exile government in China’s Northeast? Kim Il Sung himself did not request