or even whole armies. Some of the marshals were men of only modest talent (Chandler,
1998 ): prominent among the marshalate were men of outstanding bravery who, alas, were
tactically, let alone operationally, profoundly unsubtle. Marshal Ney is a name that
springs to mind. He was the commander of the rearguard in the retreat from Moscow, and
the very last man among the 25,000 who survived from the central body of the army
(which had been 450,000 strong) to recross the River Niemen. Also, though, ‘the bravest
of the brave’ was the man who single-handedly contrived to lose the Battle of Waterloo,
where he neglected to observe the most basic of rules for the conduct of a combined-
arms battle: specifically, neither infantry nor cavalry should attack unsupported by the
other. Of course, the ultimate fault lay with the Emperor, who should never have dele-
gated overall battlefield command to a man whose qualities, or lack thereof, were so well
known to him. Indeed, it is a severe indictment of Napoleon that he declined to train his
marshals in the fine art of high command, except by example. Not all were ineducable.
Second, Napoleon’s style of war, with its requirement for rapid movement by detached
corps, was shot through with the potential for lethal difficulties, or friction on a grand
scale. The principle of marching divided for speed but then uniting to fight was an ideal
rather than standard practice. Many times, especially in the opening weeks in Russia in
18 12, and fatally in the Ligny–Waterloo campaign in 1 8 15, articulated corps-sized pieces
of his army were not united when and where the Emperor needed them to be. Also, his
continuation of the innovative habit of the armies of the Revolution of living off the land
translated in practice into stealing from, looting and generally abusing the unfortunate
peasantry and townsfolk on the line of march. This practice may have contributed vitally
to the swiftness of French military movement, but it could not help but be disastrous in
its political consequences. When the territory traversed could yield little sustenance to
French foragers, the consequence was that the army went hungry. Over time, the poor
diet imposed by Napoleon’s haphazard logistics contributed to high wastage among men
and animals.
Third, France’s enemies copied, selectively adopted and adapted, and sometimes
improved upon the practices of the French military market leader. In a protracted period
of warfare, Napoleon inadvertently trained his enemies. They could not emulate his
individual genius, but they did not need to do so. Although the Grande Armée was
probably close to unbeatable when it was at its peak in 1 8 05–6, the armies of France’s
foes were far from rabbles in arms. Aside from the personal worth of its charismatic
leader, France did not enjoy an extensive lead in military effectiveness. Moreover, in
practice there were no ways in which Napoleon could prevent his enemies from closing
the military effectiveness gap, since he proved incapable of forcing any of them off the
gaming table definitively.
Fourth, by 1 808 and thereafter, although Napoleon still won battles, his enemies were
improving, while his own army was deteriorating in quality. The grim exigencies of
supply compelled him to move his troops rapidly and seek decisive battle. That neces-
sity naturally was reflected in crude battlefield tactics which entailed the suffering of
high casualties. Also, the practice of living off the land greatly facilitated desertion in
most regions, though admittedly not in Russia, and contributed to a significant loss of
discipline.
Fifth, Napoleon’s way of war proved ineffective against a maritime enemy. His
endeavours to defeat Britain, the most persistent of his enemies, tripped him into the
From limited war to national war 45