254 e lusive v ictories
proclaimed as the “Nixon Doctrine.” Th is held that countries would be
expected to provide the troops to defend themselves against insur-
gencies and local adversaries, while the United States would only inter-
vene against attacks by major communist powers or to deter nuclear
threats. Th e doctrine provided a neat rationale for Vietnamization:
Saigon would henceforth be given the same support any other nation
would receive. Predictably, President Th ieu did not see it that way, but
after pressure from Washington he agreed in mid-1969 to the first
American troop withdrawal. ^
Although Vietnamization met a pressing political need, the policy
also contained traps, some not fully appreciated at fi rst by the president
and his advisors. Americans might be pleased to see the boys coming
home, but as the stakes for the United States in Vietnam declined, the
public would also have less reason to care about the outcome of the war
or the fate of the Saigon government. Put another way, Vietnamization
set in motion the dynamics of postwar politics even as the conflict
continued. Once started, moreover, the process would be irreversible,
diffi cult even to slow down, no matter what happened on the battle-
fi eld. After all, Vietnamization represented an administration initiative
that was not tied to reciprocal actions by the other side. So if the North
Vietnamese chose to capitalize on the American withdrawal by stepping
up their own infi ltration and attacks, Washington could not claim bad
faith or use it to justify a new American military escalation. N i x o n
quickly saw his freedom of action reduced, his military options
constrained.
By choosing unilateral (if gradual) withdrawal, moreover, the Nixon
administration weakened Kissinger’s negotiating position. Th e United
States had been unable to compel the North Vietnamese to agree to
mutual troop withdrawals even when it had more than a half-million
soldiers in South Vietnam. As they started to depart, what incentive
would Hanoi have to agree to American terms?
Finally, Vietnamization did not take into account the capacity of the
Saigon government to defend itself with less American help, indeed,
possibly without any American support whatsoever. Unresolved at the
outset was whether the United States would leave behind a residual
force or, if not, continue to backstop the ARVN with air power based
in the region.