256 e lusive v ictories
especially the expanded paramilitary local units (Regional Forces/
Popular Forces), and the United States supplied modern weapons and
equipment on a much vaster scale. From a force of 700,000 in 1968, the
South Vietnamese military increased to 1.1 million in 1973. When Laird
informed Abrams that the American troop levels would be reduced,
then, he had already started a program designed to replace the soldiers
who would be leaving. He continued to cooperate dutifully with the
Pentagon even as it accelerated the withdrawal timetable or when the
NVA recovered to present new threats. ^
Abrams’s eff orts paid off in several ways. Better integration of mil-
itary and pacifi cation eff orts brought more of the population under the
eff ective control of the Saigon government, which also contributed to
winning popular loyalty through a signifi cant land-reform program.
Under the Phoenix Program, the Vietcong infrastructure was targeted,
with many operatives captured or killed. (Critics charged that many
innocent civilians were caught up in the net, too, and prisoners were
tortured or executed without trial.) It became increasingly diffi cult for
communist troops to operate near the larger population centers of
South Vietnam because they lacked the local support on which they
depended for supplies, concealment, and information. ARVN troops
demonstrated their combat prowess on several occasions, most notably
in the face of massive conventional attacks by the NVA in its spring
1972 “Easter Offensive.” As the ARVN took over for the departing
Americans, moreover, the toll in American lives fell steadily.
Still, the military picture presented disquieting elements. Although
ARVN leadership had improved, too many senior offi cers still owed
their position to their political ties to President Th ieu. Always wary of
a possible coup, he retained in key senior commands generals he knew
to be loyal. Critical military operations unraveled when these political
generals were given too much responsibility, as happened during the
incursion into Laos in early 1971 (operation Lam Son 719) and again in
several critical sectors during the heavy fi ghting in 1972.
Overall, ARVN combat performance remained uneven. Properly led,
ARVN soldiers were the equal of their communist adversaries. But
South Vietnamese units remained prone to panic, fl eeing and aban-
doning their (American) equipment on the battlefi eld, and even surren-
dered en masse when their leaders lost their nerve. This lack of