300 e lusive v ictories
of the postwar security plan. With so few troops on hand, American
commanders had only two alternative sources of trained military per-
sonnel: friendly nations that had held back from the coalition during
the invasion phase and Iraqi military and police forces. As violence
continued and then began to rise, any prospect for broadening coalition
participation evaporated. Th at left only the Iraqis. Bremer claimed that
the military and security services already had disappeared, which was
true enough, but planners had expected as much and intended to recall
troops. Overnight, the CPA head left 300,000 Iraqi men, many still
armed, unemployed and angry with the United States, a pool from
which groups opposed to the American occupation could recruit
followers.
Faced with a decision that begged for presidential intervention,
indeed, one that contravened his own policy, Bush nonetheless declined
to intervene. Bremer notifi ed Washington of his intentions just before
issuing his order, both in writing and in a video teleconference with the
president. Th e president, faithful to his management philosophy of del-
egating responsibility and not interfering in the actions of subordinates,
deferred to the offi cial on the scene. Some in the administration were
uneasy about the policy reversal, but the presumption prevailed that
Bremer better knew the local situation. Other key offi cials, including
Colin Powell, were not informed of the new policy, while the Joint
Chiefs were never asked for a recommendation. Delegation may have
its place, but Bush’s decision to defer to a man who had just arrived in
Iraq verged on an abdication of responsibility.
Bremer also short-circuited the early steps Garner had taken to estab-
lish a transitional Iraqi government. Where Garner had moved imme-
diately to gather Iraqi secular and religious leaders to chart a path to
self-rule, Bremer instead declared the CPA the acting sovereign
authority for Iraq. Many Iraqis, who had been told the United States
had come to deliver them from dictatorship, resented the idea of an
external occupation, especially by a Western power. Without clearance
from Washington, Bremer also announced plans to draft a new Iraqi
constitution and then hold an election. The sequence predictably
off ended Iraqis, who rejected the idea of a constitution written by a
non-elected body. Bremer sought to improve matters by establishing an
Iraqi Governing Council, which included a number of prominent