302 e lusive v ictories
often clashed with Bremer. But when a key commander falters, the
responsibility for correcting his actions or fi nding another offi cer who
can do better rests with those above him. Despite multiple indicators
that conditions in Iraq were deteriorating, Sanchez stayed in his post
for a year.
Violence in Iraq rose in fi ts and starts from summer 2003 onward.
Initially, before the overall upward trend became clear, the Bush admin-
istration dismissed the attacks as the work of Baathist diehards who
refused to admit defeat. When Franks’s successor at CENTCOM,
General John Abizaid, referred to a classic guerilla-style adversary, the
Pentagon immediately disavowed his comment. Th e president went so
far as to challenge the extremists, saying, “Bring ’em on,” words that
were widely reported in Iraq and helped incite passions against the
occupiers. Once it became clear that Iraq was on the path toward a
stable democracy, administration offi cials believed, the “bitter-enders”
would give up. Each dip in the violence was taken as evidence that the
corner had been turned in Iraq. Invariably, though, attacks would spike,
though Rumsfeld sometimes maintained that the fi gures refl ected more
complete reporting than any actual change on the ground. Even the
capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 did nothing to curb the
spreading violence. American troops became the target of more
insidious weapons, too. Th e fi rst improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
were used against American convoys and patrols, initiating a deadly
cycle that saw U.S. forces developing countermeasures only to
encounter ever more sophisticated roadside weapons.
Reluctant though the administration was to acknowledge the state of
aff airs, the confl ict assumed a very diff erent nature from the one the
Pentagon had planned. U.S. and coalition forces found themselves
fi ghting a “war amongst the people,” in British general Rupert Smith’s
formulation. For the American troops, it was the fi rst such confl ict
since Vietnam. So much had the U.S. Army wanted to put that
unhappy experience behind it that it had largely ceased to study coun-
terinsurgency methods during the intervening generation. Not sur-
prisingly, then, the ill-prepared soldiers and Marines responded
clumsily, using excessive force at times and alienating the very people
whose support the United States sought. American patrols, intended to
establish a “presence,” instead reminded Iraqis their country had been