398 notes to pages 179‒185
- Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 545–46, 572.
- Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 541.
- Kimball, Juggler , 140–43.
- Kimball, Juggler , 141–42.
- On the debates between the Roosevelt administration and the British
government over the future of India, see Kimball, Juggler , 132–40. - Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 313. In pursuing campaigns in Burma,
Churchill overrode the advice of his own military chiefs, who argued
the British ought to join the main American counteroff ensive across the
Pacifi c. Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 468–69. - Andrew Roberts views Italy as an illustration of “mission creep,”
a concept of our own era that refers to operations that continue
for reasons other than those for which they started. Roberts, Masters
and Commanders , 346. Even analyses that argue for the merits of a
Mediterranean strategy acknowledge that after mid-1944 it had reached
a point of diminishing returns. See Douglas Porch, Th e Path to Victory:
Th e Mediterranean Th eater in World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2004). - Hastings, Retribution , 316, 318.
- Villa, “U.S. Army, Unconditional Surrender, and Potsdam Proclamation,”
70–72. - Gideon Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 69. - Frank King, “Allied Negotiations and the Dismemberment of Germany,”
Contemporary History 16 (3) (July 1981): 585. - Kennedy, Freedom from Fear , 803.
- King, “Allied Negotiations and Dismemberment of Germany,” 592.
- Kennedy, Freedom from Fear , 854.
- Churchill fueled this narrative by claiming the president had been
deceived at Yalta. But the prime minister had agreed to the Poland
arrangement in his negotiations with Stalin the previous year. Kimball
maintains that Churchill’s post-Yalta posturing was designed to mask
similarities between the Soviet quest for a sphere of infl uence in Eastern
Europe and Great Britain’s parallel eff orts in the Mediterranean and
Middle East. Kimball, Juggler , 172–75. - Roberts, Masters and Commanders , 485–86.
- Kimball, Juggler , 100.
- Kimball, Juggler , 160ff.
- Press and public criticism of Churchill’s agreement with Stalin about
Poland, which left the London Poles in a weak position, led Roosevelt to
withdraw even his tepid support for what the prime minister had negoti-
ated. Kimball, Juggler , 167. - Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 202; Roberts, Masters and Commanders ,
519–20.