THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 169
O’Higgins was on the verge of collapse. In Buenos
Aires the people seemed to have forgotten his ex-
istence. Accompanied by his daughter, he sailed
for Europe at the end of 1823. He died in France
in 1850 in virtual obscurity. His transfi guration
into an Argentine national hero began a quarter-
century later.
San Martín’s departure left Lima and the ter-
ritory under its control in serious danger of recon-
quest by the strong Spanish army in the sierra.
Bolívar made no move to rescue the squabbling fac-
tions in Lima from their predicament; he allowed
the situation to deteriorate until May 1823, when
the Peruvian congress called on him for help. Then
he sent Sucre with only a few thousand men, for he
wanted to bring the Lima politicians to their knees.
The scare produced by a brief reoccupation of the
capital by the Spanish army prepared the creole
leaders to accept Bolívar’s absolute rule.
Bolívar arrived in Peru in September 1823. He
required almost a year to achieve political stability
and to meld into a united force the army he brought
with him and the different national units under his
command. After a month of diffi cult ascent of the si-
erra, in an altitude so high that Bolívar and most of
his men suffered from mountain sickness, cavalry
elements of the patriot and royalist armies clashed
near the lake of Junín, and the Spaniards suffered
defeat (August 6, 1824). The royalist commander,
José de Canterac, retreated toward Cuzco. Leav-
ing Sucre in command, Bolívar returned to Lima
to gather reinforcements. To Sucre fell the glory of
defeating the Spanish army in the last major en-
gagement of the war, at Ayacucho (December 9,
1824). Only scattered resistance at some points
in the highlands and on the coast remained to be
mopped up. The work of continental liberation was
achieved.
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF BRAZILIAN INDEPENDENCE
In contrast to the political anarchy, economic
dislocation, and military destruction in Spanish
America, Brazil’s drive toward independence pro-
ceeded as a relatively bloodless transition between
1808 and 1822. The idea of Brazilian indepen-
dence fi rst arose in the late eighteenth century
as a Brazilian reaction to the Portuguese policy
of tightening political and economic control over
the colony in the interests of the mother country.
The fi rst signifi cant conspiracy against Portuguese
rule was organized in 1788–1789 in Minas Gerais,
where rigid governmental control over the produc-
tion and prices of gold and diamonds, as well as
heavy taxes, caused much discontent, and where
there existed a group of intellectuals educated in
Europe and familiar with the ideas of the Enlight-
enment. But this conspiracy never went beyond
the stage of discussion and was easily discovered
and crushed. Other conspiracies in Rio de Janeiro
(1794), Bahia (1798), and Pernambuco (1801),
as well as a brief revolt in Pernambuco (1817), re-
fl ected the infl uence of republican ideas over sec-
tions of the elite and even the lower strata of urban
society. All proved abortive or were soon crushed.
The stagnation of Brazilian life and the fear of slave
owners that resistance to Portugal might spark
slave insurrections effectively inhibited the spirit of
revolt. Were it not for an accident of European his-
tory, the independence of Brazil might have long
been delayed.
The French invasion of Portugal (1807), fol-
lowed by the fl ight of the Portuguese court to Rio
de Janeiro, brought large benefi ts to Brazil. Indeed,
the transfer of the court in effect signifi ed achieve-
ment of Brazilian independence. The Portuguese
prince regent João opened Brazil’s ports to the
trade of friendly nations, permitted the rise of local
industries, and founded a Bank of Brazil. In 1815
he elevated Brazil to the legal status of a kingdom
co-equal with Portugal. In one sense, however,
Brazil’s new status substituted one form of depen-
dence for another. Freed from Portuguese control,
Brazil came under the economic domination of
England, which obtained major tariff concessions
and other privileges by the Strangford Treaty of- One result was an infl ux of cheap machine-
made goods that swamped the handicrafts indus-
try of the country.
Brazilian elites took satisfaction in Brazil’s new
role and the growth of educational, cultural, and
economic opportunities for their class. But this feel-
ing was mixed with resentment at the thousands
of Portuguese courtiers and hangers-on who came