Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

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of appropriate actions, some are complete [or perfect], and they are
called [morally] perfect actions. [Morally] perfect actions are activities
in accordance with virtue, such as being prudent and acting justly. Things
which are not of this character are not [morally] perfect actions, and they
do not call them complete appropriate actions either, but intermediate
ones, such as getting married, going on an embassy, engaging in dialectic,
and similar things.
Sa. Of [morally] perfect actions some are requirements and some not.
Requirements are advantages, expressed in predicate form, such as being
prudent and being temperate. Things which are not of this character are
not requirements. The same technical distinctions apply similarly to
inappropriate actions.
Every inappropriate action which occurs in a rational is a
[moral] mistake; and an appropriate action when perfected [or completed]
is a [morally] perfect action. The intermediate appropriate action is
measured by [reference to] certain indifferent things, which are selected
according to or contrary to nature, and which bring prosperity of such
a sort that if we were not to take them or were to reject them, except
under abnormal circumstances, we would not be happy.



  1. They say that what stimulates impulse is nothing but a hormetic
    presentation of what is obviously [or: immediately] appropriate. And
    impulse is, in general, a movement of the soul towards something. The
    impulse occurring in rational animals and that in irrational animals are
    understood to be its forms. But they have not been named. For striving
    is not rational impulse but a form of rational impulse. And one would
    properly define rational impulse by saying that it is a movement of
    intellect towards something which is involved in action. Opposed to this
    is an impulse away from [something], a movement <of intellect away from
    something involved in action.> They say in a special sense too that
    planning is impulse, being a form of practical impulse. And planning is
    a movement of intellect to something in the future.
    So, thus far impulse is used in four senses, and impulse away from
    in two. When you add the hormetic condition too, which indeed they
    also call impulse in a special sense, and which is the source of the active
    impulse, then 'impulse' is [seen to be] used in five senses.
    9a. There are several forms of practical impulse, among which are
    these: purpose, effort, preparation, endeavour, <choice,> forechoice, wish,
    wanting. So they say that purpose is an indication of accomplishment;
    effort is an impulse before an impulse; preparation is an action before
    an action; endeavour is an impulse in the case of something already in
    hand; choice is wish based on analogy; forechoice is a choice before a
    choice; wish is a rational striving; wanting is a voluntary wish.

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