Sextus Empiricus: Logic 355
to be made regarding it. And if the sign is not grasped with precision,
it will not be said to be significative of something since it itself [the sign]
is not agreed upon. For this reason, there will be no sign. Hence, also
according to this line of reasoning, the sign will be non-existent and incon-
ceivable.
- Further, this should be said. The signs are either only appearances
or only non-evident, or some signs are appearances and some non-evident.
But neither of these is sound. So, there is no sign.
That not all signs are non-evident is then shown as follows. That
which is non-evident does not appear on its own, as the dogmatists say,
but becomes known by means of something else. And the sign, then,
should it be non-evident, will need another non-evident sign, since there
is no apparent sign according to the present hypothesis, and that one
will need another, [and so on] to infinity. But it is impossible to get hold
of an infinite number of signs. So, it is impossible for the sign to be
grasped, if it is non-evident. For this reason, it will be non-evident
and, because of its not being grasped, it will not be able to be a sign
that signifies. - If all signs are appearances, since the sign is relative, and relative
to that which is signified, and relatives are grasped together, the things
said to be signified, being grasped along with appearances, will themselves
be appearances. For just as since we meet 'right' and 'left' together
neither 'right' nor 'left' is said to appear more than the other, so, since
the sign and the thing signified are grasped together, neither one should
be said to appear more than the other. 126. If that which is signified is
apparent, it will not be a thing signified, not being in need of something
that signifies and reveals it. Hence, just as the elimination of'right' means
there is no 'left' so elimination of thing signified means there can be no
sign, if someone should say that signs are only appearances. - The remaining possibility is that some signs are appearances and
some are non-evident. But in this case the problems [aporiat] remain.
For, as we have said, the things said to be signified by the apparent signs
are appearances and, not needing the sign, will not at all be things
signified, and hence, there will be no signs, since they signify nothing. - The non-evident signs will need things to reveal them. And if they
should be said to be signified by non-evident things, [then] since the
argument regresses to infinity, they are found to be ungraspable and so,
as we have said, non-existent. If, however, [the signs are signified] by
appearances, they will be appearances, being grasped along with the
appearances that are their signs, and for this reason too they will not
exist. For it is impossible for there to be some thing which is by nature