230 Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories
two most often quoted paragraphs in his “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person” (1988: 23–4).
6 Although, see the last two paragraphs in the same essay, where Frankfurt writes “the
freedom of the will appears to be neutral with regard to the problem of determinism”
(25).
7 Insofar as satisfaction does not require performance of an action, it stands to clarify
what he does not have in mind by activity when drawing the distinction between
activity and passivity (Frankfurt, 1992b). How so? Being active with respect to one’s
desires is not a matter of acting; it is, instead a matter of what one cares about. As
regards what is antecedently important to a person, which is revelatory of a person’s
cares, Frankfurt writes, “it must not be subject to his own immediate voluntary
control” (1992b as reprinted in 1999: 93).
8 See the essays by Bratman (2002), Moran (2002), and Velleman (2002), as well as
Frankfurt’s replies in the edited collection by Buss and Overton (2002).
9 In subsequent work, Watson added an important qualification to his understanding of
valuing as it issues from an agent’s valuational system. It is not to be understood,
Watson tells us, in terms of judging good. That is too rationalistic (1987, as reprinted
in Watson, 2004: 168). What we value can depart from what we regard as (objec-
tively) valuable. Perhaps what will turn the trick is “caring about something because
(in as much as) it is deemed to be valuable” (168). Nevertheless, this can fall shy of
what “might be sanctioned by a more general evaluational standpoint” (168).
10 By including Bratman’s work in a section on compatibilism about free will and moral
responsibility, we take some liberties. Bratman rather understands his treatment of
identification to speak to the topic of autonomy and explicitly indicates that caution is
needed to infer from conclusions about this topic similar conclusions about morally
responsible agency and the contested freedom it requires (Bratman, 2005: 51). Never-
theless, it is natural to see how Bratman’s work could be appropriated to the problem
both Frankfurt and Watson address regarding freedom and responsibility.
11 We owe this point to Thomas Reed, a graduate student at Florida State University.
12 For one who draws upon these resources to argue that Aristotle has a worked- out
theory of responsibility, see Irwin (1980: 132–7). Although Irwin does not use the
label “reasons- responsive” to describe what he takes Aristotle’s theory to be, he might
as well have done so.
13 See, for example, Arpaly (2003, 2006); Dennett (1984); Fischer (1994); Fischer and
Ravizza (1998); Gert and Duggan (1979); Glover (1970); Haji (1998); McKenna
(2013); Nelkin (2011); Pettit and Smith (1996); Sartorio (2016); Smith (2003); Vihve-
lin (2013); and Wolf (1990). Pereboom (2014, 2015a) defends a reasons- responsive
view of a conception of moral responsibility that does not invoke desert.
14 Fischer resists McKenna’s criticism (2004 as reprinted in 2006: 239–42). Space does
not permit further pursuit of this point.
15 Their reasons here are similar to those deployed by Nelkin in advancing her
interference- free conception of ability (see our discussion in Section 8.5).
16 Fischer (2008) has responded to Vihvelin, and Vihvelin has countered (2008).
17 Nelkin’s (2011) position might be taken as an exception to this claim.
18 We include among this class of leeway compatibilists Beebee (2000, 2003); Berofsky
(2012); Campbell (2007); Horgan (1985, 2015); Lewis (1981); and Vihvelin (2004,
2013).
19 We discussed this criticism at length (Section 3.2) when assessing classical
compatibilism.