- Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the
situation is rapidly worsening. - Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic,
technological and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be
deeply different from the present. - The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in
situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher
standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference
between big and great. - Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation to try directly
or indirectly to implement the necessary changes.
(Næss and Sessions cited in Devall and Sessions, 1985: 70)
Unlike Leopold, Næss was a trained philosopher, and so shows a greater
awareness of the need for a credible philosophical basis for ecologism. Deep ecology
requires an explanation of how particulars, such as individual animals, fit into the
whole; Næss argues that part of the definition of an organism, such as a human
being, is that it exists only in relation to something else. He uses the metaphor of
the knot – a knot exists only as part of a net, and human beings are knots in the
biospherical net (Næss, 1973: 95). Human beings are intrinsically valuable, but any
statement of that value must make reference to the whole.
Næss accepts that any realistic form of social organisation requires some ‘killing,
exploitation, and suppression’ (1973: 95). However, in principle, we should be
biospherical egalitarians, meaning we should have deep respect for all forms of life
- to restrict that respect to human beings is to mis-recognise humans, for the value
we attach to each other must depend on a full understanding of who we are – ‘knots
in the biospherical net’. Diversity enhances the potential for survival, and the chance
of new modes of life; ecological diversity should translate into respect for cultural
diversity. However, diversity must be of the right kind – diversity due to class
hierarchy is incompatible with the symbiosis inherent in the biospherical net. This
is important, because it is possible to read into nature hierarchy rather than equality;
what Næss must, however, show is that mutual dependence really does imply
equality. After all, there is a sense in which a master is dependent on his slave.
Deep ecologists, Næss argues, must fight pollution and resource depletion, and
in this struggle they have found common cause with shallow ecologists, or
environmentalists, but such an alliance can be dangerous because it distracts
attention away from the comprehensive concerns ecologists should have. For
example, if prices or taxes are increased in order to reduce pollution, then we need
to know who will bear the cost – if it is the poor, then the egalitarianism implicit
in the biospherical net is not being respected. Deep ecology favours ‘soft’ scientific
research that limits disturbances to the environment, respects traditions and is aware
of our state of ignorance.
Autonomy and decentralisation are central to Næss’s understanding of the forms
of political organisation appropriate to deep ecology: ‘the vulnerability of a form
of life is roughly proportional to the weight of influences from afar, from outside
the local region in which that form has obtained an ecological equilibrium’ (Næss,
1973: 98). A self-sufficient community produces less pollution, and depletes fewer
resources, than the existing interdependent world. Such a community is more
democratic because the chain of decision-making is much shorter – if decisions are
366 Part 3 Contemporary ideologies