THREEDIALOGUES(3) 671
unknown natures or substances, admit with the vulgar those for real things which are
perceived by the senses?
HYLAS: For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I would much
rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the objects perceived by the
senses of one, likewise perceivable to others present? If there were a hundred more
here, they would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are
not in the same manner affected with the ideas I frame in my imagination. Does not this
make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?
PHILONOUS: I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the
objects of sense and those of imagination. But what would you infer from thence? You
cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because they are perceived by many.
HYLAS: I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me into another.
Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our
minds?
PHILONOUS: It is.
HYLAS: But the same idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in any other
mind. Does it not therefore follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same
thing? And is not this highly absurd?
PHILONOUS: If the term samebe taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain (and
not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that different persons may perceive the
same thing; or the same thing or idea exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary
imposition, and since men are used to apply the word samewhere no distinction or
variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as
men have said before,several saw the same thing,so they may, upon like occasions, still
continue to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of lan-
guage, or the truth of things. But, if the term samebe used in the acceptation of philoso-
phers, who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their sundry
definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity
consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing.
But whether philosophers shall think fit to call a thing the sameor no, is, I conceive, of
small importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same facul-
ties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who had yet never
known the use of language; they would, without question, agree in their perceptions.
Though perhaps, when they came to the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness
of what was perceived, might call it the samething: others, especially regarding the
diversity of persons who perceived, might choose the denomination of differentthings.
But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? To wit, whether what is perceived
by different persons may yet have the term sameapplied to it? Or, suppose a house,
whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down,
and new ones built in their place; and that you should call this the same,and I should
say it was not the samehouse:—would we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our
thoughts of the house, considered in itself? And would not all the difference consist in a
sound? If you should say, We differed in our notions; for that you superadded to your
idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would tell
you, I know not what you mean by the abstracted idea of identity;and should desire
you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood yourself.—Why so
silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity,
without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take
this farther reflexion with you—that whether matter be allowed to exist or no, the case