a matter of ascription, but of choice; and allows toleration to be seen as
pertaining to the private domain. This notion of pluralism, however, is no
more capable of solving the toleration issues of today. In contemporary
democracy, freedom from persecution and non-interference with religious
conscience are taken from granted; toleration is therefore asked for some-
thing more. In order to grasp what is at stake, pluralism needs to be
reconsidered. Behind conceptions of the good, there are in factgroups in
marginal and subordinate positions, demanding to be recognized on an equal
footing with societal majorities, and conXicting over the public acceptance of
their diVerent identities. Thus the present-day conXict does not primarily
concern incompatible diVerences of values and cultures (which are mostly
taken care of by toleration as non-interference embodied in civil rights), but
the unequal public standing of those professing minoritarian views who,
therefore, demand toleration as a fair access for their diVerences in the public
space (Leader 1996 ). On the whole, we can say that contemporary issues of
toleration take for granted liberal toleration, but struggle for the fulWllment of
its promises of equal liberty, inclusion, and respect (Waldron 2003 ).
Only if pluralism is seen as the pluralism of groups, cultures, and identities
excluded or unequally included in democratic citizenship, can the conXict
underlying issues of toleration be seen as going beyond the disagreement
about values, beliefs, and practices (Phillips 1993 ). TheWght over the public
acceptance of diVerences can then be understood not simply as an issue of
compatibility with the ideal and the practice of liberal values and principles,
but rather as a contested attempt to reverse marginality and exclusion, and to
conquer fair access. Since marginality or exclusion come to individuals as the
consequence of membership of minority groups, the positive assertion of
diVerences in the public space is seen as theWrst symbolic step towards full
inclusion. Therefore, non-trivial contemporary questions of toleration are
basically made up of conXicts concerning the assertion and the recognition of
collective identities linked to the excluded, marginalized, or invisible groups
inhabiting contemporary democracies. Ideological and moral disagreement is
present as well and reinforces the identity conXict, allowing us to single
out and identify the issue as pertinent to toleration, according to the trad-
itional deWnition of the problem, but it is neither the primary, nor really the
salient issue.
If the collective dimension is crucial, what diVerences between which
groups constitute the circumstance in which toleration is called for
needs further exploration. In general, sources of issues of toleration are
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