distinctiveness, and had found it necessary to assert this from time to time
in the face of assimilationist policies (notably the one-language issue of
1950–2), it was not until their gains through the democratic process had
been vetoed by the central authorities that they were driven towards seces-
sion. Until then their programme had been for reforms within the state of
Pakistan (such as the Six Point Programme which called for a confederal
constitution, fiscal devolution, and separate trading and commercial rela-
tions with foreign countries). Nationalism and secessionist demands were
precipitated more by the intransigence of the central authorities than by
spontaneous articulation.
The liberation movement was strengthened by the existence of a political
movement, the Awami League, which gained support as its dominance in
national politics was resisted by Western Pakistani political factions. The
national cause, on the other hand, was weakened by the costly logistical
problems of controlling an area separated by a thousand miles of Indian
territory, and by eventual Indian military support to the Bengalis.
The internal colonialism thesis clearly provides a framework for explain-
ing secession in some contexts. However, there are some problems with it as
a general theory of nationalism and secession. The main difficulty, as has
frequently been pointed out with reference to developed countries, is that
there have been prosperous regions that have demanded political autonomy
from the state, and many poor ones that have not (Orridge, 1981, pp. 181–2;
Wood, J. R., 1981). It is arguable that Katanga (now Shaba) in the Congo,
Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and Biafra in Nigeria attempted to
secede because of their relative wealth, based on their natural mineral
resources, rather than their backwardness. The internal colonialism thesis is
further weakened by the phenomenon of ethnic nationalism and separatism
in regions yet to be extensively penetrated by capitalist development – the
Kurds, Naga and Eritrea, for example (Smith, A. D., 1979).
‘Uneven development’, producing overdeveloped peripheral regions within
poor countries, is awkward to fit into the internal colonialism model. A ‘power
disparity’ can develop, when an economically better off region with de facto
power demands de jureequality within the state. For example, although the
Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iran are among the least developed regions of
those countries, Kurdistan in Iraq has been favoured by natural conditions and
resources, notably oil. However, being rich in natural resources does not guard
against exploitation. The Kurdish parts of Iraq have consistently received dis-
proportionately small quantities of development expenditure, industrial proj-
ects and infrastructure, despite the fact that they contribute some 80 per cent of
Iraqi oil production and over 53 per cent of state revenue (Vanley, 1980).
206 Understanding Third World Politics