or less serious penalties and (3) the sentences imposed for
the commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961-95,
111 S.Ct. 2680, 2684-2701, 115 L.Ed.2d (1991),
several justices argued that the Eighth Amendment does
not require proportionate punishments. However, in
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336-37, 118
S.Ct. at 2037-38, 141 L.Ed.2d 314, the Court “adopted”
the standard of gross disproportionality for determining,
under the “excessive fines” clause of the Eighth
Amendment, whether the amount of forfeiture ordered is
grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s
offense. See also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,
609-10, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2805, 125 L.Ed.2d 488
(1993) (Excessive Fines Clause limits the government’s
power to extract payments as punishment for an offense);
State v. Schad, 160 N.J. at 184 (applying proportionality
test to fines).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has “avoided
entering the debate” about the scope of the Eighth
Amendment, State v. Oliver, 162 N.J. at 588, and has
continued to apply the three part test for judging
whether a particular punishment is cruel and unusual.
Using this criteria, the New Jersey courts have
upheld against constitutional attack: the No Early
Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, State v. Johnson 166
N.J. 523, 766 (2001); the Three Strikes Law, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.1a, State v. Oliver, 162 N.J. at 588-89; the
Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6, State v. DesMarets, 92 N.J.
62 (1983); the victim impact provision of the death
penalty statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(6), State v.
Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 36 (1996); registration of sex
offenders, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 et seq., Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J.
1, 73-74 (1995); the mandatory Drug Enforcement and
Demand Reduction (DEDR) penalty, N.J.S.A.
2C:35:15, State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 36-37 (1992);
the strict liability for drug induced death statute,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9, State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 537-
38; forfeiture of office upon conviction of a crime,
N.J.S.A. 2C: 51-2a, State v. Timoldi, 277 N.J.Super. 297,
299-302 (App. Div. 1994); and the 30 year mandatory
sentence for conviction of murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b,
State v. Johnson, 206 N.J.Super. 341 (App. Div. 1985).
II. LIMITATIONS ON CONDUCT WHICH MAY BE CRIMINALIZED
In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67, 82
S.Ct. 1417, 1420-21, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962), the Court
ruled that the legislature could not criminalize and
punish a person for his or her status, It therefore found
unconstitutional a statute which authorized a conviction
for the “crime” of being a heroin addict. However, such
a “status” does not immunize the chronic alcoholic or
addict. Rather, states may criminalize an action which
goes beyond the individual’s status. In State v. Margo, 40
N.J. 188, 190-91 (1963), the Supreme Court upheld a
conviction for being under the influence of drugs,
rejecting the claim that the statute punished the
defendant’s status. See also State v. Fearick, 69 N.J. 33, 40
(1976) (mandatory jail term for defendant who was
driving with suspended sentence and was involved in
accident resulting in physical injury constitutional even
if defendant was not at fault); State v. Housman, 131
N.J.Super. 478, 480-81 (App. Div. 1974) (mandatory
imprisonment for drunken driving not unconstitutional
even if defendant is a chronic alcoholic).A conviction for illegal reentry into the United States
does not punish status. United States v. Hernandez-
Landaverde, 65 F.Supp.2d 567, 570 (S.D. Tex. 1999).III. DEATH PENALTY (See also, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, this Digest)
IV. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
A. Generally
The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable
prisons”, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101
S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (double-celling
or overcrowded conditions not per se violations Eighth
Amendment violations). However, deprivations of basic
human needs, which include habitable shelter, food,
medical care, sanitation and exercise, Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 304-05, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2327-28, 115
L.Ed.2d 271 (1991), or conditions which cause an
increase in violence among inmates or create other
conditions intolerable for prison confinement do violate
the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
at 348, 101 S.Ct. at 2400, 69 L.Ed.2d 59; Ingalls v.
Florio, 968 F.Supp. 193, 197-98 (D.N.J. 1997).Prison officials may not use excessive physical force
against prisoners, Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 112
S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992), and have a duty to
protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114
S.Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).