charge. Consequently, any prisoner must be “informed
that any information which they [give] would not be used
against them in criminal proceedings.”
In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct.
1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976), the Supreme Court noted
that ordinarily the right to present evidence at a prison
disciplinary hearing is basic to a fair hearing, but the
inmates’ right to present witnesses is necessarily
circumscribed by the penological need to provide swift
discipline in individual cases. Thus, the right to call
witnesses is subject to the “mutual accommodation
between institutional needs and objectives and the
provision of the Constitution.”
In Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 105 S.Ct. 2192, 85
L.Ed.2d 393 (1985), the Supreme Court held that due
process requires that prison officials state at some point
their reasons for refusing to call witnesses requested by an
inmate at a disciplinary hearing.
XV. RIGHT TO PRIVACY & FOURTH
AMENDMENT
In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194
, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), the Supreme Court held that
prisoners have no expectation of privacy in their prison
cells, and accordingly, the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable search and seizures
does not apply within the confines of a prison cell.
When a prison regulation impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to penological interests. Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64
(1987).
Policy of Department of Corrections which subjects
visitors to correctional facilities to searches for CDS using
Ion Scan Machines and passive canine units did not
violate Fourth Amendment or Due Process Clause.
Jackson v. Department of Corrections, 335 N.J. Super. 227
(App. Div. 2000).
Statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10, which restricted sex
offenders access to pornographic materials was reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests and thus
constitutional. Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 218
(3d Cir. 1999).
In State v. Gillespie, 225 N.J. Super. 435 (Law Div.
1987), the Court determined that the Department of
Corrections Administrative Plan Manual was constitu-
tional and upheld the seizure of sexually explicit pictures,
which clearly fell within the manual’s definition of
contraband, finding no violation of the First, Fourth or
fourteenth Amendment rights of defendant.In State v. Fornino, 223 N.J. Super. 531 (App. Div.),
certif. denied 111 N.J. 570 (1988), cert. denied 488 U.S.
859 (1988), the Appellate Division held that monitoring
of prison inmate’s telephone calls, in the ordinary course
of correction officers’ duties, did not require a warrant.
Furthermore, defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated.A prisoner does not enjoy the same right of privacy as
non-incarcerated persons and official surveillance has
traditionally been the order of the day. Defendants’
motion to suppress a conversation between them,
following their arrest, which was overheard by officials
using electronic surveillance was therefore properly
denied below. State v. Ryan, 145 N.J. Super. 330 (Law
Div. 1976).XVI. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107
S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), the United States
Supreme Court held that prison policy preventing
inmates assigned to outside work detail from attending
afternoon religious service did not violate prisoner’s
rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment to the Constitution.Prisoners must be provided “reasonable opportuni-
ties” to exercise their religion freedom guaranteed under
the First Amendment. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322
fn.2 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081 fn.2, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972).XVII. RELINQUISHMENT OF PRISONER TO
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Governor has discretion to extradite prisoner serving
life sentence in New Jersey to another state where he faces
the death penalty. State v. Robbins, 124 N.J. 282 (1991).The temporary relinquishment of defendant from
the state to federal authorities for prosecution is a matter
of comity between jurisdictions which did not violate
defendant’s constitutional or statutory rights nor did it
require that service of the state sentence commence on the
date of transfer to the federal authorities. For purposes of
determining parole eligibility, service of defendant’s state
prison sentence commenced on the date of his return to