ology. He claims that if critical inquiry did not have its own procedures then it
would “merely be a study of the soul’s progress, like an Upanis.ad.” This is a rather
important remark. Reasoned inquiry and scriptural studies are now claimed to
have the same eventual goal or purpose; where they differ is in method. That
marks a departure from Kaut.ilya’s purely instrumental conception of rational-
ity, in which the use of reason could equally well serve any end. For Va ̄tsya ̄yana
wants to claim that there can be rational goals, as well as rational means, and
so to distance the Nya ̄ya system from the free-thinkers in the epics.
Let us first see that Va ̄tsya ̄yana shares the epic horror of aimlessreason.
Reason, he says, can be used in one of three ways. One may employ it in a good
and proper way (va ̄da), as one does when one’s goal is to ascertain the truth of
the matter. One may employ it in a bad or improper way (jalpa), as when one’s
goal is to defend one’s position at all costs, using any intellectual tricks one can
think of. Finally, one might employ reason in a negative and destructive way
(vitan.d.a ̄). Here one has no goal other than to undermine one’s opponent. People
who use reason in this way are very like the sceptics and unbelievers of the epics,
and Va ̄tsya ̄yana disapproves. He claims indeed that to use reason in this way is
virtually self-defeating:
Avaita ̄n.d.ikais one who employs destructive criticism. If when questioned about
the purpose [of so doing], he says “this is my thesis” or “this is my conclusion,” he
surrenders his status as a vaita ̄n.d.ika.If he says that he has a purpose, to make
known the defects of the opponent, this too is the same. For if he says that there
is one who makes things known or one who knows, or that there is a thing by
which things are made known or a thing made known, then he surrenders his
status as a vaita ̄n.d.ika.^8Vitan.d.a ̄is the skeptic’s use of reason. Va ̄tsya ̄yana’s point is that someone who
presents an argument against a thesis has at least that refutation as their
goal, and so commits himself to the machinery of critical examination. But a
vaita ̄n.d.ikawho accepts this gives up his claim to use reason aimlessly, without
commitment. So the aimless use of reason is not just pernicious, it is self-
defeating!
The salient point here is that reason must have a purpose, and the question
is what that purpose should be. Va ̄tsya ̄yana’s answer is clever. He argues that a
goal is a rational one if it is the rational means to some further goal. And he
claims that whatever one’s eventual goal is, the rational way to achieve it is
through the acquisition of knowledge – knowledge about one’s goal and how it
might be achieved. So the acquisition of knowledge is always a rational goal.
Indeed it is the rational goal par excellence, for knowledge is instrumental in the
rational pursuit of any other goal:^9
Since there is success in one’s activities when the awareness of one’s object is pro-
duced by an accredited method of knowing (prama ̄n.a), the method of knowing is
connected with the object. Without a method of knowing, there is no awarenesshinduism and the proper work of reason 415