Aristotle on divine movement and human nature 243
by Dirlmeier,^20 are insufficient to account for this discrepancy, for the
problem can be regarded as a problem of consistency both withinEth. Eud.
8. 2 and betweenEudemian EthicsandOn Divination in Sleep. It is therefore
necessary to study the part played by the distribution argument in both
contexts.
Aristotle’s assertion that it is ‘paradoxical’ (atopon) that a god should send
gifts to foolish people and not to the best and the wisest, may be understood
in the light of a passage inEth. Nic. 1179 a 21 ff. There it is argued that if
there is such a thing as a divine concern (theia epimeleia) with human affairs,
this will be directed to those people who cultivate intelligence (nous), the
thing in which they are most akin to the gods and in which the gods take
pleasure. These people are the wise (sophoi), who act rightly and nobly, and
therefore they are the most beloved by the gods.
Although it is by no means certain that Aristotle himself accepted the
existence of such a ‘divine concern’,^21 it is clear in his view thatifthere is
such a thing it will be concerned with the best and wisest, for they are most
beloved by the gods just because they cultivate their intelligence. The same,
hypothetical frame of argument is to be found inDiv. somn. 462 b 20 – 2 :if
the gods really sent dreams to people – an idea which in itself is ‘irrational
on other grounds as well’ – then it would be ‘paradoxical’^22 that they should
send them to simple and foolish people, not to the best and wisest. Thus the
degree to which a person is ‘loved by the gods’ (theophil ̄es) depends on the
extent to which someone actualises ‘excellence’ (aret ̄e, both intellectual and
(^20) From Dirlmeier’s remarks in his commentary ( 1962 a) it can be concluded that he has not noticed
the problem. At 1247 a 28 – 9 he refers toOn Divination in Sleep: ‘Gegen eine von Gott verursachte
Traummantik erhebt Ar. denselben Einwand: es sei paradox, daß Gott der Sender sei, das Wahrsehen
aber nicht den<
senden sollte, sondern den gew ̈ohnlichen Leuten’
(p. 483 ). On 1248 a 15 he remarks: ‘er hat bez ̈uglich der Gottgesandtheit der Tr ̈aume seine Ansicht
(man darf wohl sagen: sp ̈ater) modifiziert’ (p. 490 ). On 1248 a 34 he says: ‘In der Richtigkeit von
Tr ̈aumen hat Ar. sp ̈ater keine Gottesgunst mehr gesehen. Ich beschr ̈anke mich, auf den Traktat
De divinatione per somnum zu verweisen...und bez ̈uglich der “Melancholiker” aufProbl. 953 a
10 – 955 a 4 ’(p. 492 ).
(^21) This question has been hotly disputed, as has the question whether Aristotle really believed in the
existence of these ‘gods’. It is to be noted that inEth. Nic. 1179 a 23 ff., as well as in 1099 b 10 ff.,
Aristotle neither accepts nor rejects the conception of ‘divine concern’ (
) and of ‘divine
dispensation’ ( ); it seems that he did not want to go so far as to draw the conclusion,
which in the light of his theology in its strictest form was perhaps inescapable, that there is no room
for such divine concern. See on this Verdenius ( 1960 ) 60 ;P ̈otscher ( 1970 ) 69 – 71 ; Bod ́e ̈us ( 1975 ) 28.
(^22) It should be noted that both inEth. Eud. 1247 a 28 and inDiv. somn. 462 b 22 the word'
is used, which connotes both ‘out of place’ and ‘paradoxical’: it expresses an element of surprise,
either in respect to what can be, generally speaking, thought real and reasonable, or in respect to the
context in which the'element stands; as such it is often used by Aristotle to point his finger
to inconsistencies in the theories of others; cf.Ph. 196 b 1 ;Eth. Eud. 1239 a 1 – 6 ;Metaph. 1079 a 25 ;
Eth. Nic. 1178 b 14.