20 William Wohlforth, ‘U.S. strategy in a unipolar world’, in Ikenberry, America Unrivalled,
pp.98–121; Paul, ‘Introduction’, in Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, Balance of Power, pp. 1–29.
21 Kagan, ‘End of dreams’.
22 Krasner, ‘Realism, imperialism’, p. 39.
23 A point made repeatedly by historical sociologists. See for example Hendrik Spruyt, The
Sovereign State and its Competitors(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). See also
Sørensen, Changes in Statehood.
24 Admittedly, some versions of realism, especially defensive realism, do to some extent
include the idea of softer versions of anarchy; see for example Anders Wivel, ‘Balancing
against threats or bandwagoning with power?’, Cambridge Review of Interrnational Affairs,
21 (3), 2008, pp. 289–305.
25 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979),
p. 18.
26 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 77.
27 Spruyt, The Sovereign State; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States,
AD990–1900 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
28 Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural
Realism(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
29 This is not to indicate that ‘International Society’ or ‘English School’ theorists are much
concerned with ‘unlike units’; they are not. In that sense, the argument developed here
is not an ‘English School’ argument.
30 Spruyt, The Sovereign State.
31 Kai Alderson, ‘Convergence under anarchy: does international competition cause state
socialization?’, paper for ISA Annual Meeting, Toronto, March 1997.
32 Heterogeneity at the system level, that is. Within the EU, the innovation has led to
convergence, and therefore a deeper homogeneity than is found in the international
system as a whole.
33 Waltz would probably subsume such heterogeneity under differences in power, and
maintain that his theory is about great powers, not the small fry of the international
system.
34 See Sørensen, Changes in Statehood.
35 Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory’, p. 329.
36 For the argument that Durkheim indeed indicated that anarchy itself may change, see
John Barkdull, ‘Waltz, Durkheim, and international relations: the international system in
an abnormal form’, The American Political Science Review, 89 (3), 1995, pp. 669–680.
37 Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, ‘Norms, identity and
culture in national security’ in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security:
Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996),
pp. 33–75.
38 Buzan and Little use the idea of ‘unlike units’ to suggest international societies composed
of states and non-state actors. The argument here is focused on major types of sovereign
states. See Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking
the Study of International Relations(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
39 The ‘post-’ prefix is a way of emphasizing that we are not quite clear on what shape and
form the postmodern state will eventually take but, at the same time, we are quite certain
that it is different from the modern state. The reader should be warned that the label
‘postmodern’ is being used in several different ways by scholars, some of which do not
at all correspond to the way it is used here. For a comparison of my usage with Robert
Cooper’s, see Sørensen, ‘The case for combining’, pp. 17–20.
40 Robert Jackson, ‘The weight of ideas in decolonization’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert
O. Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993),
pp. 111–39.
41 Jackson, ‘The weight of ideas’, p. 130.
42 Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations(New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003),
p. 44.
122 Structural realism and changes in statehood