Noriega: Poindexter said he came in the name of President Reagan. He said that Panama and
Mexico were acting against US policy in Central America because we were saying that theNicaragua conflict must be settled peacefully. And that wasn't good enough for the plans of the (^)
Reagan administration. The single thing that will protect us from being economically and politically
attacked by the United States is that we allow the contras to be trained in Panama for the fight
against Nicaragua.
Wallace: He told you that you would be economically attacked if you didn't do that?
Noriega: It was stated, Panama must expect economic consequences. Your interest was that we
should aid the contras, and we said 'no' to that.
Poindexter outlined plans for a US invasion of Nicaragua that would require the fig-leaf of
participation of troops from other countries in the region:
Noriega: Yes, they wanted to attack Nicaragua and the only reason it hadn't already happened was
that Panama was in the way, and all they wanted was that Panama would open the way and make it
possible for them to continue their plans.
According to Noriega's advisor, Panamanian Defense Forces Captain Cortiso,
"[the US] wanted that Panamanian forces attack first. Then we would receive support from US
troops." [fn 36]
It was in this same December, 1985 period that Bush and Don Gregg met with Ambassador Briggs
to discuss the Noriega's refusal to follow dictation from Washington. According to Gregg in his
deposition in the Christic Institute lawsuit, "I think we [i.e., Bush and Gregg] came away from the
meeting with Ambassador Brggs with the sense that Noriega was a growing problem, politically,
militarily, and possibly in the drug area." When pressed to comment about Noriega's allegedrelations to drug trafficking, Gregg could only add: "It would have been part of the general picture (^)
of Noriega as a political problem, corruption, and a general policy problem. Yes." [fn 37] "I don't
recall any specific discussion of Noriega's involvement in drugs," Gregg testified. In this case it is
quite possible that Don Gregg is for once providing accurate testimony: the US government
decision to begin interference in Panama's internal affairs for the overthrow of Noriega had nothingto do with questions of drug trafficking. It was predicated on Noriega's rejection of Poindexter's
ultimatum demanding support for the Nicargauan contras, themselves a notorious gang of drug
pushers enjoying the full support of Bush and the US government. Colonel Samuel J. Watson III,
deputy national security adviser to Bush during those years, invoked executive privilege during the
course of his Christic Institute deposition on the advice of his lawyer in order to avoid answeringquestions about Bush's 1985 meeting with Briggs. [fn 38]
In addition to the question of contra aid, another rationale for official US rage against Noriega had
emerged during 1985. President Nicky Barletta, a darling of the State Department and a former vice
president of the genocidal World Bank, attempted to impose a package of conditionalities andeconomic adjustment measures dictated by the International Monetary Fund. This was a package of (^)
brutal austerity, and riots soon erupted in protest against Barletta. Noriega refused to comply with
Barletta's request to use the Panamanian military forces to put down these anti-austerity riots, and
the IMF austerity package was thus compromised. Barletta was shortly forced out as president.
During 1986-1987, Noriega cooperated with US law enforcement officials in a number of highly
effective anti-drug operations. This successful joint effort was documented by letters of
commendation sent to Noriega by John C. Lawn, at that time head of the US Drug Enforcement
Administration. On February 13, 1987, Lawn wrote to Noriega: "Your longstanding support of the
Drug Enforcement Administration is greatly appreciated. International police cooperation and