174 The Nature of Political TheoryEverything depends here on the concept of ‘theory’. Empirically-orientated theories
(in political science or sociology) tend to search for the causal conditions for nation-
alism. In this sense, there can be a universal empirical theory of nationalism—but
the operative point here is that it is a theory ‘of’. Nationalism is asocial objectto
be explained via, say, its economic, political, or social function. Nationalism can be
universal, since, regardless of its internal rhetoric, in reality, it performs other univer-
sal functional roles. However, others would contend that nationalism isnota social
object, but is rather asocial subject(fictional or real); in this case it involves normative
and ontological theory, which not only gives a descriptive account of how meanings
come about, but also indicates what we ‘ought’ or ‘ought not’ to do.
However, in fact, neither empirical theory nor more abstract universalist normative
theories (Kantianism and utilitarianism), seem really appropriate for nationalist polit-
ical theory. The form of theory befitting nationalism appears to be a more situated or
conventionally based one. Yet a number of problems arise here. There are many con-
ventional forms of social existence (families, neighbourhoods, associations) within
which individuals are situated. Why should the conventional structure of nationalism
take any priority? It clearly does not figure very predominantly in most people’s lives,
except in extreme situations, like war or civil conflict. So what reason can be offered?
Clearly one answer, which we have already canvassed, is that its non-existence in our
everyday consciousness may be a sign of successful or mature nationhood, namely, it
is subliminal. However, it is difficult to see how this could be known or proved.
One further related question is: do theoretical beliefs constitute the nation? If they
do, then shared characteristics cannot be embedded. In this case, a populace would be
reliant upon theorists and politicians to create and feed them their nationalist ideas.
Nationalism itself would be pure artifice,evenwhen claiming to be natural. Nation-
alism, in this reading, is an abstract theory, exactly like Kantianism, but embedded
within its abstractions is a false claim about the importance of natural embedded
particulars. In this sense, it is an elaborate charade. Alternatively, national beliefs
could be said to be embedded in the community, in which case an appeal to a political
theory called nationalism would be totally superfluous. This is indeed one strong
argument underpinning the separation (made by some theorists) betweennation
andnationalism, as well as one of the forceful contentions concerning the purported
untheoreticalcharacter of the nation. The problem with this embedded interpretative
view is precisely the problem of particularity. How can an untheorizable embedded
particular become a universalist theory? Nationalist theorists never actually get round
this conundrum. This would particularly be the case with liberal nationalism.
However, given that we accept that some normative case can be made for nation-
alism, three major arguments usually figure in the liberal nationalist position. First,
there is the communitarian argument that we are socially contextual or embedded
beings. We are constituted through the community and its values. We cannot be prior
to society in any way. Many recent nationalist writers thus advocate a social, embed-
ded, or contextual individualism, as against an atomistic individualism. One can
therefore be a normative individualist whilst rejecting methodological individualism.
In fact, many proponents contend that the procedural liberal idea of the individual