A Treatise of Human Nature

BOOK I PART IV or annihilation with like parts and in a like or- der, as at its first appearance, we are not apt to regard these ...

BOOK I PART IV and from that propensity, which they give us, to suppose them the same; and according to the precedent reasoning, ...

BOOK I PART IV may observe, that the view of any one object is not sufficient to convey the idea of identity. For in that propos ...

BOOK I PART IV patible with the relation of identity, it must lie in something that is neither of them. But to tell the truth, a ...

BOOK I PART IV ipate of the changes of the co-existent objects, and in particular of that of our perceptions. This fiction of th ...

BOOK I PART IV out anyvariationorinterruptionin the object; in which case it gives us the idea of unity. Here then is an idea, w ...

BOOK I PART IV by which the mind can trace it in the different periods of its existence, without any break of the view, and with ...

BOOK I PART IV guish betwixt the objects and perceptions of the senses; which they suppose co-existent and re- sembling; yet thi ...

BOOK I PART IV senses. I shall be sure to give warning, when I return to a more philosophical way of speaking and thinking. To e ...

BOOK I PART IV idea by an act or operation of the mind, sim- ilar to that by which we conceive the other. This circumstance I ha ...

BOOK I PART IV to lie only in the time, and never exert our- selves to produce any new image or idea of the object. The facultie ...

BOOK I PART IV find any such objects, we may certainly con- clude, from the foregoing principle, that they are very naturally co ...

BOOK I PART IV tion is an effect of the continued view of the same object, it is for this reason we attribute sameness to every ...

BOOK I PART IV and find the new perceptions to resemble per- fectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is ...

BOOK I PART IV The persons, who entertain this opinion con- cerning the identity of our resembling percep- tions, are in general ...

BOOK I PART IV these interrupted images we ascribe a perfect identity. But as the interruption of the appear- ance seems contrar ...

BOOK I PART IV Nothing is more certain from experience, than that any contradiction either to the sen- timents or passions gives ...

BOOK I PART IV our thought along our resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity, we can never without reluctanc ...

BOOK I PART IV will be proper to touch upon some principles, which we shall have occasion to explain more fully afterwards. (Sec ...

BOOK I PART IV ing, and neither to be annihilated by our ab- sence, nor to be brought into existence by our presence. When we ar ...