A Treatise of Human Nature

BOOK I PART IV organ of sensation; and that being impossible in a simple impression, obliges us to remove the whole, and proves ...

BOOK I PART IV existence of body. When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude, that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smel ...

BOOK I PART IV SECTIONV. OF THEIMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL Having found such contradictions and diffi- culties in every system con ...

BOOK I PART IV philosophers, they promise to diminish our ig- norance; but I am afraid it is at the hazard of running us into co ...

BOOK I PART IV thened with some additional ones, which are peculiar to that subject. As every idea is de- rived from a precedent ...

BOOK I PART IV operates, and from what object it is derived. Is it an impression of sensation or of reflection? Is it pleasant, ...

BOOK I PART IV ceived, after any manner, may exist after the same manner. This is one principle, which has been already acknowle ...

BOOK I PART IV stance; which seems to me a sufficient reason for abandoning utterly that dispute concerning the materiality and ...

BOOK I PART IV for the immateriality of the soul, which seems to me remarkable. Whatever is extended con- sists of parts; and wh ...

BOOK I PART IV ble, and divisible, as well as the body; which is utterly absurd and contradictory. For can any one conceive a pa ...

BOOK I PART IV or tangible, that has parts disposed after such a manner, as to convey that idea. When we diminish or encrease a ...

BOOK I PART IV ers, to make two, three, four desires, and these disposed and situated in such a manner, as to have a determinate ...

BOOK I PART IV our perceptions and objects, except those of the sight and feeling. A moral reflection cannot be placed on the ri ...

BOOK I PART IV It will not now be necessary to prove, that those perceptions, which are simple, and exist no where, are incapabl ...

BOOK I PART IV the other are supposed to lie in the very visi- ble body, and to be separated from each other by the whole length ...

BOOK I PART IV ticular taste and smell. These relations, then, of causation, and contiguity in the time of their appearance, bet ...

BOOK I PART IV bodies we never fail to place such as are resem- bling, in contiguity to each other, or at least in correspondent ...

BOOK I PART IV as a fig, and its particular taste, it is certain that upon reflection we must observe this union something altog ...

BOOK I PART IV our reason, which shows us the impossibility of such an union. Being divided betwixt these op- posite principles, ...

BOOK I PART IV capable of it; and that endeavour again arises from our inclination to compleat an union, which is founded on cau ...