274 Social Cognition
better if we could avoid it. Thus, our need to know the social
world inevitably involves a tension between accuracy and de-
fensive motives (e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1988). Defensive mo-
tives reflect our desire to see ourselves and our social worlds
in desirable, positive ways and to avoid unflattering or threat-
ening realities. This tension is reflected in research examin-
ing the perceiver’s need to feel like a reasonable, rational
agent. Although previously described research has suggested
that people often apply stereotypes as a sort of default, only
going beyond a stereotypical impression when accuracy mo-
tivation is high and need for closure is low, there are some
cases in which this tendency may be undermined by a differ-
ent set of concerns.
Sometimes individuals may be reluctant to apply stereo-
types in their judgments of others because such stereotypes
are considered socially undesirable or inaccurate. As re-
viewed in the previous section, this kind of situation can mo-
tivate effortful attempts to suppress stereotypes or otherwise
correct for their influence on judgments. More generally,
people may be reluctant to render judgments about others un-
less they feel they have a defensible basis for doing so (e.g.,
Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Corneille, 1998). For example, if pre-
sented with a male versus female target (e.g., just a picture
and no other information) and asked to judge the person’s
suitability for an engineering job, judges would probably be
very reluctant to rely on sexist stereotypes. Under these cir-
cumstances, they would very likely feel that they were not
entitled to judge the person. However, if given a résumé to go
along with the photo, perhaps containing evaluatively mixed
credentials, they may then feel entitled to judge (and might
very well rely on their sexist stereotypes under this circum-
stance). In a different vein, some individuals typically do not
rely on social stereotypes because they do not view persons
(or groups) as having very stable, enduring qualities (Levy,
Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998). For these persons, simply
knowing a person’s group membership does not seem like a
very informative basis for forming impressions, so they must
satisfy their epistemic motivations by seeking out other kinds
of data. Perceivers thus must balance their tendency to use
simplifying generalizations with their desire to feel that they
have a valid and reasonable basis for judging others. This
latter desire can derive as much from defensive as from epis-
temic motivations.
Perhaps the most classic example of a defensive motive is
the desire for self-enhancement. People want to think well
of themselves and avoid confronting their own shortcomings.
This powerful motivation has been examined in innumer-
able psychological studies (for a review, see Pittman, 1998).
The obvious implication for social cognition is that people are
motivated to form self-serving impressions, and this tendency
has been documented in many ways. To pick but one exam-
ple, it has been found that people are more likely to activate
and apply negative stereotypes when self-enhancement needs
have been aroused by a recently experienced threat to self-
esteem (Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998). As pre-
viously noted, one fundamental motivation for prejudice and
stereotyping may be the fact that their application can provide
a mechanism whereby the perceiver can feel superior to oth-
ers (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 1997). In addition to economizing
cognition, stereotyping thus can simultaneously gratify other
motivational constraints.
In addition to wanting to feel superior to others, we also
want to feel impervious to harm and to believe that the world
is fair and just. The phenomenon of “blaming the victim”
(e.g., Lerner, 1998) is one important by-product of these
profound needs. If bad things can happen to good people, this
has disturbing implications for our senses of safety and
justice. Consequently, we may come to view the victims of
unfortunate circumstances as possessing qualities that pre-
cipitated or otherwise can explain their unhappy fate. Lerner
argues that these beliefs often operate in a primitive, implicit
manner in shaping our impressions and blame reactions,
rather than through a more conscious application of deduc-
tive reasoning. Seen in this light, applying negative stereo-
types to members of socially disadvantaged groups can be
seen as a way of bolstering our sense that the existing system
of social inequality is just and appropriate (see also Jost &
Banaji, 1994).
Perhaps the greatest threat to our sense of safety and
invulnerability comes from the recognition of our own mor-
tality. Research on terror management (e.g., Pyszczynski,
Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999) suggests that we have a fun-
damental motivation to defend ourselves against confronting
our own eventual demise. One strategy for coping with this
unpleasant reality lies in the creation and maintenance of
broader worldviews that imbue life with a sense of meaning
and purpose that extend beyond the life of the individual. In a
series of studies, it has been shown that reminding people of
their own mortality results in the motivation to bolster one’s
cultural worldview. One way in which this can be accom-
plished is by disparaging individuals who threaten or contra-
dict one’s worldview, such as the members of other social
groups (Schimel et al., 1999). Given the wide array of defen-
sive motivations that are addressed by forming negative and
hostile impressions of out-groups, the enduring manifesta-
tions of intergroup conflict around the world may seem all the
more intractable.
Research of this sort shows that although accurate percep-
tions are important to attainment of control, other powerful
needs operate, pushing us toward perceiving the world in