Leaders 9E
ach daybringsnewhorrorstoUkraine,whereRussianartil
lery fire echoes like thunder across cities and towns. The
metropolis of Kharkiv lies in ruins, victim of two weeks of bom
bardment. Mariupol, on the coast, has been destroyed.
It is too soon to know if a winner will emerge from the fight
ing (see Briefing). But, on the other side of the planet, the world’s
emerging superpower is weighing its options. Some argue that
China will build on a prewar friendship with Russia that knows
“no limits”, to create an axis of autocracy. Others counter that
America can shame China into breaking with Russia, isolating
Vladimir Putin, its president. Our reporting suggests that nei
ther scenario is likely (see China section). The deepening of ties
with Russia will be guided by cautious selfinterest, as China ex
ploits the war in Ukraine to hasten what it sees as America’s in
evitable decline. The focus at all times is its own dream of esta
blishing an alternative to the Western, liberal world order.
Both China’s president, Xi Jinping, and Mr Putin want to
carve up the world into spheres of influence dominated by a few
big countries. China would run East Asia, Russia would have a
veto over European security and America would be forced back
home. This alternative order would not feature universal values
or human rights, which Mr Xi and Mr Putin see as a trick to justi
fy Western subversion of their regimes. They appear to reckon
that such ideas will soon be relics of a liberal
system that is racist and unstable, replaced by
hierarchies in which each country knows its
place within the overall balance of power.
Hence Mr Xi would like Russia’s invasion to
show up the West’s impotence. If the sanctions
on Russia’s financial system and hightech in
dustry fail, China will have less to fear from
such weapons. If Mr Putin lost power because
of his miscalculation in Ukraine, it could shock China. It would
certainly embarrass Mr Xi, who would be seen to have miscalcu
lated too, by allying with him—a setback when he is seeking a
third term as Communist Party leader, violating recent norms.
For all that, however, Chinese support has its limits. The Rus
sian market is small. Chinese banks and companies do not want
to risk losing much more valuable business elsewhere by flout
ing sanctions. A weak Russia suits China because it would have
little choice but to be pliant. Mr Putin would be more likely to
give Mr Xi access to northerly Russian ports, to accommodate
China’s growing interests in, say, Central Asia, and to supply it
with cheap oil and gas and sensitive military technology, includ
ing perhaps the designs for advanced nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, Mr Xi seems to believe that Mr Putin does not
need to win a crushing victory for China to come out ahead: sur
vival will do. Chinese officials confidently tell foreign diplomats
that Western unity over Russia will splinter as the war drags on,
and as costs to Western voters mount. China is already trying to
prise apart Europe and America, claiming that the United States
is propping up its power while getting Europeans to foot the bill
for high energy prices, larger armies and the burden of hosting
over 3m Ukrainian refugees.
China’s approach to the RussoUkraine war is born out of MrXi’sconvictionthatthegreatcontestinthe21stcentury will be
between China and America—one he likes to suggest that China
is destined to win. For China, what happens in Ukraine’s shelled
cities is a skirmish in this contest. It follows that the success of
the West in dealing with Mr Putin will help determine China’s
view of the world—and how it later has to deal with Mr Xi.
The first task is for natoto defy Chinese predictions by stick
ing together. As the weeks turn into months that may become
hard. Imagine that the fighting in Ukraine settles into a grim pat
tern of urban warfare, in which neither side is clearly winning.
Peace talks could lead to ceasefires that break down. Suppose
that winter draws near and energy prices remain high. Ukraine’s
example early in the war inspired support across Europe that
stiffened governments’ sinews. The time may come when politi
cal leaders will have to find the resolve within themselves.
Willpower can be linked to reform. Having defended demo
cracy, Western countries need to reinforce it. Germany has de
cided to deal with Russia by confronting it, not trading with it
(see leader). The European Union will need to corral its Russia
sympathisers, including Italy and Hungary. The Britishled Joint
Expeditionary Force, a group of ten northern European coun
tries, is evolving into a first responder to Russian aggression (see
Britain section). In Asia, America can work with its allies to im
prove defences and plan for contingencies,
many of which will involve China. The joined
up action that shocked Russia should not come
as a surprise to China if it invaded Taiwan.
And the West needs to exploit the big differ
ence between China and Russia. Three decades
ago their two economies were the same size;
now China’s is ten times larger than Russia’s.
For all Mr Xi’s frustration, China has thrived un
der today’s order, whereas Russia has only undermined it. Obvi
ously, Mr Xi wants to revise the rules to serve his own interests
better, but he is not like Mr Putin, who has no other way of exert
ing Russian influence than disruptive threats and the force of
arms. Russia under Mr Putin is a pariah. Given its economic ties
to America and Europe, China has a stake in stability. Shanghai on the Dnieper
Rather than also push China “outside the family of nations,
there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its
neighbours”—as Richard Nixon wrote years before his famous
trip to Beijing five decades ago—America and its allies should
show that they see the rising superpower differently. The aim
should be to persuade Mr Xi that the West and China can thrive
by agreeing where possible and agreeing to differ where not.
That requires working out where engagement helps and where it
threatens national security (see next leader).
Might China yet start down this path by helping bring the war
in Ukraine to a swift end? Alas, barring the Russian use of chem
ical or nuclear weapons, that looks unlikely—for China sees
Russia as a partner in dismantling the liberal world order. Dip
lomatic pleading will influence Chinese calculationsless than
Western resolve to make Mr Putin pay for his crimes.nThe war in Ukraine will determine how China sees the West—and how threatening it becomesThe alternative world order