recently issued a tender for eight maritime reconnaissance aircraft to replace the
navy’s aging TU-142s. Indian officials turned down an offer from Washington
to lease the IN two P-3Cs as an interim solution.^37 In addition, a recent request
from the IN to procure 60 multi-role combat aircraft (over and above a request
from the Indian Air Force for 126 such aircraft) would add a new dimension to
the navy’s land-based air capabilities. While little information is available on this
tender, it likely will not be fulfilled until 2010–11.^38
Aircraft-carrier operations are central to India’s ability to control the sea far
from Indian shores or deny it to others. New Delhi remains committed to a force
of two to three carriers. The navy’s current carrier, theViraat,has approximately
ten years of service life left. By that point, the IN expects to have INSVikrama-
ditya(the ex-Admiral Gorshkov) in service, along with an Indian-built carrier.
TheVikramadityais expected to join the fleet in 2008, with an expected service
life of twenty-five to thirty years.^39 The indigenous carrier, until recently dubbed
an ‘‘air-defense ship,’’ should reach its initial operating capability in 2012. Its air
wing will include some twenty fixed-wing aircraft and ten helicopters.^40 If the
indigenous carrier design proves effective and efficient, India will probably
construct a second ship in the class.
India does not anticipate guarding Indian Ocean SLOCs alone. If state or non-
state actors posed a substantial threat to shipping, India would work with other
sea powers to protect shipping. While India is slowly building up its capacity to
conduct such operations, it remains an open question how vigorously Indian
naval forces will exercise and train with other navies to support combined
operations. This is largely a political issue, and key decisions will be taken at a
levelwellabovethatofthenavy’shighcommand.Butthetrendappearstobe
toward close cooperation with local, regional, and great-power navies in anticipa-
tion of future combined operations. Indian and U.S. officials point to the escort
operations performed by the IN during the run-up to Operation Enduring
Freedom, when IN vessels accompanied high-value U.S. vessels through the
Strait of Malacca. Washington and New Delhi have discussed renewing this
arrangement should circumstances warrant.
Along India’s western flank, however, there appears to be a cleavage between
aspirations and the combined operational work needed to achieve them. After
September 11, the U.S. Central Command organized a combined task force,
CTF 150, in the northern Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. CTF 150, whose
missions include combating piracy and maritime terrorism, has been a multilat-
eral undertaking since its inception. Naval forces from numerous European
countries, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan have taken part in its
operations, while officers from various countries—including Pakistan—have
commanded it. Interestingly, to date the IN has not participated in this effort,
for reasons New Delhi has not made public.^41 Indian naval forces have deployed
to CTF 150’s area of operations, as well as to the Persian Gulf.
India as a Maritime Power? 141