The Price of Prestige

114 chapter four

Although the Canadian initiative did not result in a special recogni-

tion for middle powers in the United Nations, it did succeed in inserting

the concept into the international political discourse. Yet if middle pow-

erhood was to be a meaningful political distinction, it required a clear

definition. Interestingly, early efforts at defining middle powers did not

focus on traditional power estimates but rather on David Mitrany’s ( 1933 )

conceptualization of functional structures of political hierarchy. Middle

powers were seeking legitimacy in hierarchical structures that best suited

their endowments. Thus, a middle power is an actor that fulfils a specific

set of functions: “since major powers are differentiated by their greater

functions from the rest, the middle powers ask that they be distinguished

from the lesser ones by the same criteria” (Gelber 1945 ). A functional

definition of this sort is prone to producing circularity — a middle power

is an actor behaving like a middle power and vice versa. But, circular logic

aside, what were those attractive functions that were supposed to be iden-

tified with middle powerhood?

Not surprisingly, middle- power advocacy focused on international pro-

sociality. The Canadians tried to justify their claim for special- status recog-

nition by arguing that middle powers are more prosocial and more respon-

sible than other actors.^20 It is the behavior that defines the class and gives it

merit (Holbraad 1984 , 71 ). The first wave of UN peacekeeping, which was

the result of a Canadian initiative, reinforced this view (Boyd 1964 , 81 ).

According to this advocacy, unlike the great powers, middle powers are

not strong enough to impose their narrow self- interest and hence are natu-

ral coalition builders and sponsors of international cooperation (Higgott

and Cooper 1990 ). Because they support peace, development, and coop-

eration, they should gain greater influence, which will enable them to pro-

tect the interests of the collective. This argument quickly collapses into the

collective welfare model or prosociality, the shortcomings of which were

discussed at length above. Moreover, the middle powers’ inability to form

a unified front during the negotiations played an important role in the

failure of the Canadian UN initiative. This failure to promote the group in-

terest raises serious questions regarding the claim that middle powers are

uniquely skilled in the art of cooperative coalition building. It is unlikely

that such a diverse cluster of actors could overcome the collective action

problem and create a prosocial bloc as envisioned by middle- powerhood

advocates.^21

Middle powers occupy a tough spot in the international hierarchy. They

are trapped in the constant need to balance emulation and differentiation