50 Zhou Qiong and Li Mei,“Qing zhong hou qi Yunnan shanqu nongye
shengtai,” 126.
51 Bao Shichen,Qimin si shu, 173. For an introduction to his views on agricul-
ture, see Rowe,“Bao Shichen.”
52 Cao Shuqiao,“Diannan zazhi,” 11 : 5983.
53 Hengeveld,“Biodiversity,” 7.
54 The state targeted shack people in the Lower Yangzi for disruption of the
empire’s core agriculture and those in the Middle Yangzi for hindering water
control; Leong,Migration and Ethnicity, 157 , 171 , 176 – 77.
55 QSL,DG 17 / 4 / 7 , 37 : 590 a–b; Tao Zhu,Tao Wen Yi Gong (Zhu) ji, 2 : 982.
Tao may have pioneered a system of false reporting to obtain disaster relief tax
remission that was subsequently regularized in the Lower Yangzi; Jones and
Kuhn,“Dynastic Decline and the Roots of Rebellion,” 130.
56 Osborne,“The Politics of Land Reclamation,” 30 – 36 ;Xi’an xianzhi, 748 – 49 ;
Changhua xianzhi, 133 – 34 ; Tao Zhu, Tao Wen Yi Gong (Zhu) ji,
2 : 2095 – 2102. For accounts of the highland soil erosion, including rocky
desertification in Guizhou’s karst peaks, linked to shack people’s maize culti-
vation, seeWucheng xianzhi, 16 : 28 b– 29 a; Leong,Migration and Ethnicity,
158 – 59 ; Han,“Maize Cultivation and Its Effect on Rocky Desertification,’
243 – 58. New World crops have been condemned and praised for both their
impoverishing and enriching effects, respectively, on Zomian cultivators; Lan
Yong,“Ming Qing Meizhou nongzuowu yinjin,” 3 – 14 ; Pan Xianlin,“Gao
chan nongzuowu chuanru,” 60 – 64.
57 Weiyuan tingzhi, 371 – 81 ;Kaihua fuzhi, 68 ;DG 16 / 10 / 8 ,QSL, 472 a– 73 a.
58 See, for example, Vermeer,“The Mountain Frontier in Late Imperial China,”
300 – 29.
59 Merlin,On the Trail of the Ancient Opium Poppy, 53 – 54.
60 Neige, xingke tiben, weijin lei, DG 8 / 5 / 22 ,# 10092 (tongben); Gongzhong
dang, falü dalei, jinyan, DG 14 / 11 / 28 ;YPZZ,DG 18 / 12 / 18. For a general
discussion of constraints on opium prohibition in Yunnan, see Bello,Opium
and the Limits of Empire,Chapter 6.
61 Zhuang Jifa,Qing Gaozong shi quan wu gong, 284 ; Woodside,“The Ch’ien-
lung Reign,” 264 , 267.
62 Jiaqing Daoguang liang chao shangyu dang,JQ 14 / 1 / 5 , 14 : 8 a–b. There is
disagreement over the Konbaung state’s degree of centralization, but its con-
trol of the Shan States along the Yunnan frontier was at best indirect; Koenig,
The Burmese Polity, 17 , 107 , 220 , 224 – 25 ; Leach, “The Frontiers of
‘Burma’,” 49 – 68.
63 Jiaqing Daoguang liang chao shangyu dang,JQ 14 / 1 / 5 , 14 : 8 a–b. The problem
of dual tributary allegiance was not limited to the Yunnan borderlands. The
Ryukyu Islands, for example, maintained tribute relations overtly with the
Qing and covertly with the Tokugawa domain of Satsuma; Sakai,“The
Ryukyu (Liu-Ch’iu) Islands asfief of Satsuma,” 112 – 34. I am grateful to
Rod Wilson for pointing out this similarity.
64 Daoguang Yunnan zhi chao, 11 : 527.
65 Jiaqing Daoguang liang chao shangyu dang,JQ 17 / 4 / 6 , 17 : 119 a–b; JQ 20 / 1 /
17 , 20 : 27 b;Xu Yunnan tongzhi gao, 5 : 3 , 979 ; Yongchang fuzhi, 438 b;
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