“WE WILL BE TWO ISMAILS”idea that we have to support Eg ypt because otherwise the Arab world [would turn
against the Soviet Union] ...”^27
Contrary to his previous visit and despite his bad back, this time Louis requested,
and was treated to, a tour of Sinai—the first Soviet to visit this “occupied territory,”
which underlined his “unofficial” capacity. This even allowed him to go as far as
“suggesting” to his Israeli hosts that they should extend their conquest west of the
canal—presumably in order to test their response.
Louis may or may not have been honest about Soviet intentions and assessments—
depending on what he actually knew—but he certainly helped to establish the mis-
leading impression that the Soviets were neither confident in, nor supportive of, Arab
military capability. Eban was clearly referring to him, to Primakov or to both when
he testified shortly after the October war: “there were also signals from Soviet person-
alities—hard to tell how authoritative they were, but they took care to spread [this
notion], and it was accepted almost without reservation worldwide, that ... the Soviet
Union does not want war.”^28
B. Brezhnev’s insomnia at San Clemente
At the “Western White House,” Kissinger and Gromyko had a long preliminary ses-
sion to wrangle over a rephrasing of the Moscow “principles.” As before, contention
centered on Resolution 242 and whether full peace following an Israeli–Eg yptian
settlement should be linked to a comprehensive regional one (i.e., including the
Palestinians).^29 As in Moscow a year before, this remained the main unresolved issue
going into the top leaders’ talks.
On the final night (23 June), as Kissinger would write, they had all gone to bed
early when
at ten o’clock my phone rang. It was the Secret Service informing me that Brezhnev was up
and demanding an immediate meeting with the President, who was asleep. It was a gross
breach of protocol ... a transparent ploy to catch Nixon off guard and with luck to separate
him from his advisors. ... It transpired that Brezhnev had been seized with an all-consum-
ing desire to discuss the Middle East.Dr Chazov, who accompanied Brezhnev to San Clemente, has provided a differing
explanation for this sleepless night: in the spring of 1973, Brezhnev began to display
symptoms of atherosclerosis of brain blood vessels, “the first harsh experiences with
his health which affected his nervous system. This in turn caused insomnia.”^30
As Nixon would describe it, Brezhnev was in top form, trying “to browbeat me
into imposing on Israel a settlement based on Arab terms. He kept hammering.”
Kissinger holds that
The Soviet leader made his most important proposition of the entire trip: that the United
States and the Soviet Union agree then and there on a Middle East settlement, based on