FRAMING THE CROSS-CANAL GOALArabs,” he confided, “are asking for it. On one hand it is tempting to have so many
advisers. On the other hand, our advisers’ blood will be shed”—indicating his expec-
tation that hostilities would resume during their tenure.
Karpov—who was already breaking field-security instructions by keeping a diary—
went further by entering his own irreverent reflections. Considering the prospect of
battalion-level advisers, he had identified two chronic problems: communicating with
the Eg yptians, and the gap between the old guard of war-seasoned Soviet officers and
the younger ones who would occupy the lowest echelon:
From the [Soviet] state’s viewpoint it’s a luxury. What good would it do for them to come?
Even now we don’t have enough interpreters, and without them the advisers cannot do
anything. Besides, I’m sure that those to be sent would not be genuine commanders, so
we’d have an extra burden to teach them.Few younger Soviet officers could match the authority of, for instance, Lt-Col.
Yury Azovkin, the adviser to the II Army Corps’ artillery brigade: he was made an
HSU in 1945 for repelling repeated attacks on his surrounded detachment in Poland,
personally killing thirty Germans.^9 “Now,” Karpov wrote, “at least the brigade com-
manders’ advisers do work directly with the battalions, but when the [additional]
advisers come they will not.” A year later, however, he noted that such advisers did
arrive. Malashenko puts this “in the summer of 1968” and specifies a group of 400
that included advisers at battalion as well as SAM (surface-to-air missile) divizyon
and air squadron level, with more arriving later.
By early February 1968, from a “Soviet official,” the CIA picked up
the first information received [sanitized] regarding Soviet plans to participate in a limited
Arab offensive against Israel ... Whereas previously Soviet advisors [sanitized] stayed in the
background and played a limited role in shaping and organizing Arab armies, they are now
actively engaged in reorganizing Arab forces and engaging in some command functions.This corroborated reports from Beirut during the previous weeks whereby “when
the fighting is resumed, the Soviets will actively aid the Arabs ... Soviet advisors
would direct a limited attack against Israel.” The Soviets were emboldened since “the
[USS] Pueblo incident dramatically indicated that the United States ... will avoid a
commitment of its forces ... The Soviets believe that the United States will not inter-
vene on Israel’s behalf unless the pre-June 1967 borders are crossed.”
The CIA’s sources, therefore, stressed that a Soviet-supported Eg yptian offensive
would be of limited scope—to drive the Israeli forces back “three or four miles” from
the canal. It would be meant only to improve Eg ypt’s bargaining position in respect
of Sinai rather than to destroy Israel itself (in which the Soviets “would not acqui-
esce”). And it would be undertaken only if diplomatic efforts—the already forlorn
mission of UN emissary Gunnar Jarring under Resolution 242—failed. Actually, the
Soviets set little store by the Jarring mission, which he undertook while serving as