248 n ormalization and after
There is, however, one signifi cant departure from the past. India has
become more sensitive to Israel’s security concerns. Unlike the past, it
counsels caution and restraint on “both” sides. For example, in the initial
days of the second Lebanese war (2006), it was critical of Hezbollah’s
abduction of Israeli soldiers, which precipitated the crisis.^34 Its stance on
the controversial security fence highlights this shift. In November 2005,
it told the United Nations that “no one could have objections to the con-
struction of the wall in areas coinciding with the green line. However, its
encroachment on Palestinian land and interests creates great hardship
for the people aff ected by its construction and exacerbates the situation.”^35
Its primary concerns were not the security fence per se but its actual loca-
tion in an area whose claims still remain disputed and unresolved. Prior
to normalization, India would have been less restrained and probably
would have employed fi ery rhetoric.
Of late, however, Indo- Israeli relations have entered a third and more
complex phase.
The Complex Stage 3
While the seeds for elevation of bilateral relations were sowed
when the non- INC National Demo cratic Alliance (NDA, 1998– 2004)
government was in power, it was the Congress Party that cemented the
third phase of Indo- Israeli relations. India has begun diff erentiating bi-
lateral interests from its diff erences over the peace pro cess. This has been
the policy of the West. Countries such as Britain, France, and Germany
do not allow their strong disagreements over the peace pro cess to impede
bilateral ties and interaction. Stronger criticisms of Israel are often ac-
companied by robust bilateral linkages and interactions. To paraphrase
the yishuv’s position on World War II, India promotes bilateral ties as if
there were no peace pro cess and disagrees over the peace pro cess as if there were
no bilateral relations.^36
In the absence of offi cial documents, it is diffi cult to pinpoint the ex-
act timeframe, but a de cade after normalization, Indo- Israeli relations
have clearly entered a third and interesting phase. If the 1990s marked
India’s desire to diff erentiate normalization and the support for the
Palestinians, the early part of the twenty- fi rst century presented a new
shift. Without articulating it formally, India has made a distinction be-
tween its diff erences with Israel over the peace pro cess and the need to