normalization and after 249strengthen bilateral ties. The willingness of the UPA government to
promote joint missile research (July 2007) signals that disagreement
over the Palestinian issue does not impede both countries from pursu-
ing converging interests.^37 This decision came against the background
of prolonged demands of the Indian left to suspend or freeze military
cooperation with Israel.^38
Operationally, this approach creates extra diplomatic space for India.
To garner domestic support for closer economic and military ties with
Israel, New Delhi has to highlight and even overemphasize its diff er-
ences over the peace pro cess. That way it not only reiterates support for
the Palestinians but also justifi es its security dealings with Israel. In the
past, strong disagreements over the peace pro cess prevented India from
talking to Israel po liti cally. In this third phase, Indo- Israeli relations play
out along two parallel tracks: convergence over bilateral ties and strong
diff erences over the peace pro cess. Such a complex approach is inevitable
for the furtherance of Indo- Israeli relations. By adopting a dual posture
toward Israel, various po liti cal parties could rally around the bilateral re-
lations. It is in this context that one should view the willingness of the
UPA government (2004–) to enhance its economic and po liti cal relations
with Israel. A complex and nuanced approach toward Israel is essential to
enhance and expand the support base for bilateral ties. In other words,
disagreement over the peace pro cess is a po liti cal price that Israel will
have to pay if bilateral ties are to fl ourish.
Such disagreements are not painful for Israel. Historically, except in
matters closer to its immediate neighborhood, India has not been proac-
tive. Nehru led the struggle against colonialism because it was a po liti cal
movement that did not demand any major sacrifi ce on India’s part. Its
active involvement in resolving various international confl icts and ten-
sions virtually came to an end following the 1962 Sino- Indian confl ict. Its
endorsement of various national- liberation movements were expressed
through po liti cal support, not military aid. This diff ered from the Chi-
nese practice of providing ideological and material support to various
radical movements, including the Palestinian Fedayeens. Even at the
height of its pro- Arab policy, India had not armed Israel’s adversaries,
something that China and Rus sia mastered during the cold war. Thus
India’s disagreements with Israel over the peace pro cess are primarily
po liti cal and do not pose any strategic challenges to Israel.
Within this broad contour, how have the bilateral relations progressed
since 1992?