Egyptian naval units and paratroopers would then try to take Sharm
al-Sheikh at the southern end of the Sinai Peninsula. MI was also
aware of many details of the Syrian war plans.
These war plans notwithstanding, the MI analysts estimated that
Egypt had no intention of actually going to war against Israel. Even
when all signs indicated that Egypt and Syria were prepared for war
the Israeli military intelligence experts maintained their position—in
fact, almost until the very day the war broke out.
The main reason for this intelligence failure, which caused Israeli
leaders to be caught completely by surprise, was that from 1969 al-
most until the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War the MI’s analysis was
based on an unwavering Concept—that, in the prevailing circum-
stances, the Arabs were unwilling to go to war against Israel. The
Concept was based on minutes of Egyptian government sessions pro-
vided to the Mossadby Nasser’s son-in-law, Marwan Ashraf. Ac-
cording to these documents, the Egyptian government was so over-
whelmed by the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War that it believed
that its army would be unable to overcome Israel until Egypt received
from the Soviet Union long-range Sukhoi aircraft and Scud missiles.
The possession of this weaponry might enable the Egyptian Army to
overcome Israeli forces, especially Israeli air superiority, and even
serve as a deterrent factor for the time being.
Moreover, Anwar Sadat, who became president of Egypt after the
death of Nasser in September 1970, used a kind of “cry wolf” tactic, fre-
quently declaring in public that 1971 would be “the Year of Decision”;
yet there was no war that year. In 1972 Sadat continued to threaten ag-
gression against Israel; there was no war that year either. Then in April
1973 Ashraf provided an early warning that by the end of April, later re-
vised to May, Egypt would launch a war; again, April and May 1973
passed uneventfully, except for a small-scale mobilization of Israeli re-
serves. What’s more, this mobilization had been costly and, as it turned
out, unnecessary at the time except perhaps for deterrence.
What no one in Israel knew was that Sadat had resolved to wait no
longer for the Sukhois and Scuds. He would go to war with the pro-
tection of heavy SAMs and artillery.
In April and May 1973, a full six months before the coordinated
Egyptian and Syrian attacks on the Sinai Peninsula and Golan fronts,
MI had received the warning from Ashraf on an Egyptian plan to322 • YOM KIPPUR WAR06-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 322