launch a war. The MI analysts realized that Sadat had the necessary
divisions prepared to cross the Suez Canal, the necessary bridging
gear, and SAMs to protect the operation from the penetrating raids of
the IAF. But the Concept was so rooted in intelligence thinking that
the director of Military Intelligence (DMI), Major General Eliyahu
(Eli) Zeira, still maintained that there was a low probabilityof war.
This prognosis might have been correct in the spring and summer of
1973, but it was completely wrong in the fall.
In August 1973 the Syrian army carried out a massive deployment
of troops and weaponry along the Golan front, accompanied by a
dense SAM network, which covered the airspace over the Golan
Heights as well as the Syrian divisions. The MI analysts dismissed
this deployment as being defensive against Israeli air strikes. Noth-
ing further occurred at that time, but on 13 September 1973 IAF jets
were attacked during a reconnaissance mission over Syrian territory.
The IAF planes shot down 12 Syrian aircraft and suffered one loss.
This naturally reinforced the military belief that the Arabs would not
attack due to Israel’s once-again proven air capability.
King Hussein’s warningto Israeli prime minister Golda Meir on
25 September that the Syrian army was ready and Syria intended to
go to war against Israel was barely credited by the MI analysts. The
Concept still dominated all thinking: Egypt was not planning to go to
war without Sukhois and Scuds, and Syria would not attack without
Egypt. Therefore, Syrian intentions could not really be aggressive.
This view held even after U.S. intelligence provided the Mossad on
the night of 29/30 September with its assessment that a combined
Egyptian-Syrian attack was possible. Israel replied that it was not
something to worry about. In fact, some time after the 13 September
air battle, and after the meeting between Hussein and Meir, DMI
Zeira asserted that Egypt would not contemplate even a war of attri-
tion against Israel before the end of 1975. The Egyptian military
buildup continued to be explained away as a practice exercise with-
out harmful intentions. Syrian deployments should have given even
more cause for concern. After 13 September, Syrian reinforcements
were sent to the Golan Heights, furloughs were canceled, reserve
troops were called up, and a state of alert in Syria was declared.
King Hussein of Jordan was the most senior source who provided Is-
rael with an early warning, although he was not an Israeli agent. HumanYOM KIPPUR WAR• 32306-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 323