intelligence (HUMINT) had a key part in contributing information to
MI, in addition to signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelli-
gence (IMINT). The identities of the various HUMINT sources are still
top secret, and for good reason, but public sources later revealed Ashraf
as the Mossad’s Top Source. Admiral Fulvio Martini, a previous di-
rector of the Italian Naval Intelligence, was very close to the Mossad;
when traveling to Arab countries he would carry a concealed camera to
photograph Arab military installations for the Israelis. One of the
Mossad operators was a professor of languages who flew into Israel on
4 October, bringing photocopies of the Egyptian-Syrian war plan bear-
ing the code name of war, “Badr Operation”; the identification of this
source has not been revealed. Ibrahim Shahin, an Egyptian, provided
confirmatory-type warnings about the Egyptian army movements in the
Suez Canal zone; Sahin was arrested by Egyptian authorities after the
war and sentenced to death.
In September and early October 1973, when Egypt was obviously
preparing for war, Israeli military intelligence remained locked in the
iron grip of the Concept that Egypt still had no intention of actually
launching a war. This sense had been reinforced throughout much of
1973 by Egyptian ministers in their contacts with Western govern-
ments avowing their country’s peaceful intentions. Even more effec-
tive than the diplomatic ploy was Egyptian military deception. Re-
ports were issued of instructions to cadets at military colleges to
resume their courses on 9 October, and officers were given leave to
make the pilgrimage to Mecca on 4 October. The Egyptian press and
radio announced that 20,000 reservists had been demobilized. Imme-
diately before the assault on the morning of 6 October the Egyptians
deployed special squads of troops along the Suez Canal; their task
was to move about without helmets, weapons, or shirts, to swim and
fish in the canal, and eat oranges, reinforcing the image of unpre-
paredness. Syria also engaged in political deception, though far less
than Egypt. For example, Radio Damascus announced on 4 October
that President Hafiz Assad would begin a nine-day tour of Syria’s
eastern provinces on 10 October.
To maintain secrecy, the presidents of Egypt and Syria did not re-
veal their intention of launching a war against Israel even to their sen-
ior officers. In Egypt, President Sadat and his minister of war, Ismail
Ali, kept the war plans to themselves alone until 1 October. In Syria324 • YOM KIPPUR WAR06-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 324