Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

382 notes to pages 89‒94

21. Clements, “Woodrow Wilson and World War I,” 62–63, 81 ; Clements,
    Presidency of Woodrow Wilson , 125.


22. Clements, “Woodrow Wilson and World War I,” 73.


23. Clements, Presidency of Woodrow Wilson , 125–28.


24. Clements, “Woodrow Wilson and World War I,” 62–63 ; Th ompson,
    “Woodrow Wilson and World War I,” 334, 336.


25. Clements, Presidency of Woodrow Wilson , 126.


26. Clements, Presidency of Woodrow Wilson , 131–32.


27. Ferrell, “Woodrow Wilson: Misfi t in Offi ce?” 65–66.


28. Clements, Presidency of Woodrow Wilson , 123–24. House’s title was honor-
    ifi c. Wilson’s emissaries did not always do his bidding, however. As House
    became more pro-Allied, he sought to commit the president to enter the
    war on the side of the Entente if Germany refused to negotiate a peace
    agreement. See Clements, Presidency of Woodrow Wilson , 129–30.


29. Clements, Presidency of Woodrow Wilson , 129–31 ; Th ompson, “Woodrow
    Wilson and World War I,” 336.


30. Trask, “American Presidency,” 307.


31. Clements, Presidency of Woodrow Wilson , 137.


32. Trask, “American Presidency,” 302. Trask adds that because the war repre-
    sented a fundamental challenge to stability by German power, the issues
    could not be resolved by anything less than complete victory for one side.


33. Clements, Presidency of Woodrow Wilson , 124.


34. Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New
    York: Random House, 2001, 2003), chap. 22.


35. Link, Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson , 97.


36. Clements, Presidency of Woodrow Wilson , 136.


37. Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon , 25, 28.


38. Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon , 56. More recent accounts
    suggest the incident may not have happened. Esposito, “Political and
    Institutional Constraints on Wilson’s Defense Policy,” 1115.


39. See Edward Coff man, “American Military and Strategic Policy in World
    War I,” in War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War, 1914–1918 , ed.
    Barry Hunt and Adrian Preston (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefi eld,
    1977), 67–84.


40. Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon , chap. 7.


41. Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon , 38–39, chap. 6.


42. Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon , 4.


43. Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon , chap. 5, 157–58.


44. Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon , chap. 9. Finnegan’s detailed
    account makes it clear that Wilson took little active interest in army
    modernization in the prewar period, contrary to the claims of some histo-
    rians. For an example of that view, see Arthur Link and John W. Cham-
    bers, “Woodrow Wilson as Commander-in-Chief,” in Th e United States
    Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989 , ed. Richard