390 notes to pages 139‒143
- Th is point is suggested by Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief: Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Th eir War (1987; reprint ed.,
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 49–50. - In the mid-1930s, the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Investigation
of the Munitions Industry, better known after its chairman as the Nye
Committee, held a well-publicized series of hearings that suggested a
tie between American arms manufacturers and other industries and the
decision to enter the war. See David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear:
Th e American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 387–88. - Watt, How War Came , 612.
- Watt, How War Came , 261.
- Watt, How War Came , 268. See similarly, Ambrose, “‘Just Dumb Luck,’” 59.
- Jonathan G. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937–1941 (1985; reprint ed.
New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 14. - Watt, How War Came , 134–36.
- Watt, How War Came , 264–66.
- Gullan, “Expectations of Infamy,” 516–17.
- Larrabee, Commander in Chief , 46–47.
- Utley, Going to War with Japan , xiv–xv.
- Utley, Going to War with Japan , 9–10, 19–21.
- Utley, Going to War with Japan , 98–100.
- Lowenthal, “Roosevelt and the Coming of the War,” 418–19, 424–25.
- Utley, Going to War with Japan , 112ff. For several decades, the United
States had maintained a grandiosely titled Asiatic Fleet, based in the Phil-
ippines. Although headed by a full admiral, it lacked capital ships (aircraft
carriers or battleships) and could off er scant resistance to a major Japanese
move south of French Indochina toward Singapore, the Dutch East Indies
(now Indonesia), or the Philippines. Th e Asiatic fl eet was fought to virtual
destruction in the four months following the start of war in the Pacifi c in
December 1941. See W. G. Winslow, Th e Fleet the Gods Forgot: Th e U.S.
Asiatic Fleet in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982, 1994). - Watt, How War Came , 266.
- Ambrose, “‘Just Dumb Luck,’” 59.
- Lowenthal, “Roosevelt and the Coming of the War,” 421–22; Larrabee,
Commander in Chief , 46–47. - Th e incremental path toward an alliance with Great Britain began in
summer 1940 when the president agreed to transfer a number of
American World War I destroyers to the Royal Navy in exchange for
bases that the U.S. Navy could use. Lowenthal, “Roosevelt and the
Coming of the War,” 422–23. Th e Roosevelt–Churchill relationship
has been treated at length by several historians. See Warren F. Kimball,
Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War (New
York: William Morrow, 1997).